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RECENT CASES
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE-COMPREHENSIVE CLAUSE EXCLUDING
MECHANICAL BREAKDOWN-REQUIREMENT THAT EXCLUDED RISK
BE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE
Plaintiff's gravel truck was insured by defendant against "any loss ...
except damages caused by collision."' Damage "due and confined to ...
mechanical or electrical breakdown" was excluded by a separate clause. In
an action on the policy, plaintiff proved that immediately after the truck
passed over several severe bumps, its frame cracked. Verdict was rendered
for the plaintiff in the lower court. Held, affirmed. Although mechanical
breakdown was a concurring cause, the jury could properly find that the
proximate cause of the loss was the impact of the bumps, an insured risk.
Terrien v. Pawtucket Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 71 A.2d 742 (N.H. 1950).

The "comprehensive" clause, under which the plaintiff in the instant
case was insured, is a standardized type of coverage which is now being
written by all of the major automobile insurers. 2 Because of its comparatively
recent origin, there are not many cases construing its language and applying
it to factual situations. 3 Consequently, policyholders cannot at present be
advised with certainty as to their rights. However, no unique problems seem
to be involved, and probably a satisfactory construction can be worked out
on ordinary principles of insurance law.
The principal problem in construing this type of policy is the extent to
which the comprehensive clause is limited by the exclusion of losses "due and
confined" to mechanical or electrical breakdown, wear and tear, or freezing.
Confronted with this exclusion clause, one lower court declared it void as a
"trap" for the unwary policyholder. 4 This conclusion was promptly repudiated on appeal, 5 and has not appeared again. While the exclusion clause may
not be a "trap," it generally is not worded in such a manner as to make its
meaning absolutely clear. 6 just when is a loss "due and confined" to mechanical or electrical breakdown, or any of the other excluded risks?
The court in the instant case cited Lunn v. Indiana Lumberrnens Mit.
Ins. Co.7 and apparently followed the test laid down therein by the Tennessee
1.Plaintiff was insured against collision by a separate clause, but this apparently
had no effect on the decision.
2. 5 APPL=MAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3222 (1941); 6 BLASHFIELD,
CYCLOPEDIA OF AUrOmoBiLE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3653 (1945).
3. 5 Am. JuP., Automobiles § 510.5 (Supp. 1949) ; Note, 171 A.L.R. 264 (1947).
4. Hemel v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 25 So.2d 357 (La. App. 1946).
5. Hemel v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 211 La. 95, 29 So.2d 483 (1947).
6. "A reading of the exclusion clause discloses an almost insurmountable confusion
of words and doubtful construction." McConnel, The Limitation of Risk in Automobile
Upset and Collision Policies, 1950 INs. L.J. [No. 329] 393, 395.
7. 184 Tenn. 584, 201 S.W.2d 978, 171 A.L.R. 259 (1947).
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court. If the excluded risk is the "sole proximate cause" of the loss, the insurer is not liable; but if any tnexcluded risk is a proximate cause of the
loss, there is liability. This test seems to be sound, in view of the language
of the exclusion clause and the strong policy to resolve ambiguities in favor
of the insured.8 It is in accord with the many cases which hold that the intervening occurrence of an excluded event will not defeat a recovery for loss
which is proximately caused by an insured risk.9 However, the fact that
comprehensive coverage has not proved profitable to insurers ° may influence
some courts to adopt a construction less favorable to the insured.
Assuming that the Luion test will be adopted generally by the courts,
the use of the proximate cause concept leaves room for a wide variation of
problems on the facts. Of these, perhaps the simplest type is illustrated by
the principal case, in which an included risk (unusual jarring) produced an
excluded risk (mechanical failure), which, in turn, caused the' loss. Recovery
here is clearly correct,"1 as is emphasized by cases involving related problems
12
under other types of policies.
Whether the moving force, the unexcluded risk in this type of case,
is the proximate cause of the loss is generally held to be a question for the
jury. 13 The reasonable expectation of the parties in entering the 'contract
of insurance should be relevant.' 4 This consideration may be an important
factor in those cases .wherethe producing cause cannot realistically be separated
from the intervening excluded risk. A mechanical breakdown which occurs
without any unusual external strain is ordinarily the result of someone's
negligence; and thus it might be held beyond the coverage even if it were
proximately caused, -for example, by the negligence of a garage attendant.
The insurer might have an even stronger case if the negligence relied upon
as a producing cause were that of the insured. However, proof of unusual
circumstances -aggravating a. mechanical defect should favor the insured.
Likewise, the insured possibly should recover if the excluded condition were
8. See Sulzbacher v. Travelers Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1943); Myers
v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 99 .2d'485 (4th Cir.'1938). " " *
9. See, e.g., General Excli. Ins.-.Corp, v.. Jinney, 279 Ky. 76; 129 SVW.2d 1014, 122
A.L.R. 920 (1939); Boiling v. Northern Iis. Co., 253 App. Div. 693, 3 N.Y.S2d 599
(1st Dep't 1938); aff'd, 280 N.Y. 510, 19 .N.E.2d .920 (1939); c IRadella.v, Bankers
Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 165 Pa. Super. 633, 70 A.2d 407 (1950).
10: 5 APPLEM x, IxsuRAxcE LAW "AND PAcrrcz § 3222 (1941),. --"
11. Cf. Tonkin v. California Ins. Co., 294 N.Y. 326, 62 N.E.2d 215, 160 A.L.R.
944 (1945) ; Unkelsbee v. Homestead Fire Ins. Co., 41 A.2d 168 (D.C. Mun. App. 1945).
But cf. Shahin v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 265 App. Div. 397, 39 N.Y.S.2d 887 (4th Dep't
1943)...,
12. See Notes, 126 A.L.R. 707.,(1940) (windstorm insurance); 166 A.L.R. 380
(1947) (same).; 4 A.L.R.- 1298 (1919) '(hail insurance); 7 A.L.R. 373 (1920) (same);
130 A.L.R. 710 (1941) (sprinkler leakage coverage) ; 32 MINN. L. Rav. 71 (1947).
13. Princess Garment Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 115 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1940);
Jiannett! v. National Fire Ins. Co., 277 Mass. 434, 178 N.E. 640 (1931); Kenney v.
Accidental Ins. Co., 66 Ohio App. 2, 34.N.E.2d 237 (1940).
14. See Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,' 224. N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86, 87, 13
A.L.R. 875, 877 (1918).
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a condition caused by the wilful act of a third party, such as a theft of
antifreeze, resulting in a cracked engine-block during a cold snap.
Recovery will probably be denied where the excluded risk is the moving
15
force, bringing into play an unexcluded risk which causes loss. Moreover,
it would seem that if a natural force operates upon a defective condition of the
automobile which is an excluded risk, no recovery should be allowed. Hence,
in the Lunn case, the insurer was held not liable for a collision resulting from
air resistance which swung a defectively-locked hood into the driver's line of
vision.
The number of different factual combinations which might give rise
to an action on this type of policy is obviously large. Jury verdicts on many
of the questions raised will be conclusive. Under these circumstances it probably will not be desirable to attempt to crystallize the different situations into
positive rules of law. The proximate cause test of the Lunn case may be
the best that can be devised, even after the pertinent cases have begun to
multiply.
BAILMENTS-DELIVERY OF POSSESSION-PROPERTY DEPOSITED IN
PUBLIC LOCKER IN RAILROAD STATION
Plaintiff, a jewelry dealer, deposited a package of jewels, valued at over
$2700, in defendant's public locker in a railroad station. The locker was
operated by inserting a dime, turning the lock, and removing the key. Defendant company held a master key to.service the lockers .and to remove any
packages left longer than twenty-four hours. Held, the deposit of the package
in the locker did not create a common law bailment upon which an action for
loss of the package could be based. Marsh z' American Locker Co., 72 A.2d
343 (N.J. 1950).
Although many courts have said that a bailment is a delivery of an object
upon a contract, express or implied,' this definition has been criticized 2 on the
ground that bailment does- not depend, on a contractual relationship between
the parties.5 A broader definition- of a bailment terms it the rightful possession
of personal property by one whb'is not the owner. 4 With the exception of the
15. Cf. Fogarty v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 122 Conn. 245, 188 Atl. 481 (1936). But
,
see 32 MINN. L. REv. 71 (1947).
1. Bertig Bros. v. Norman, 101 Ark. 75, 141 S.W. 201, Ann. Cas. 1913D 943 (1911)
aff'd, 124 Ark. 599 (1916) ; Coons v. First Nat. Bank of Philmont, 218 App. Div. 283,
218 N.Y. Supp. 189 (3d Dep't 1926) ; Krumsky v. Loeser, 37 Misc. 504, 75. N.Y. .Supp.
1012 (Sup. Ct. 1902); Massart v. Narragansett Electric Co., 54 R.I. 154, 171 Atl. 238
(1934). See STORY, LAW OF BArr SENTS § 2 (7th ed. Bennett, 1863).
2. See Laidlaw, Principles of Bainent, 16 CORNELL LQ . 286 (1931).
3. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 73 (1936); SCHOuLER, LAW oF BAILMENTS § 9
(2d ed. 1887) ; 4 WILuSTON, CONTRACTS § 1032 (REv. ed. 1936) ; Laidlaw, supra note 2.
4. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1032 (Rev. ed. 1936).
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constructive bailment,5 or the instance where the bailee comes into possession
involuntarily, 6 it is universally held that there must be a delivery of possession,
either real or constructive,7 to the bailee by the bailor.8 This transfer of possession must be complete, giving the bailee sole custody and control, even as
against the owner for the term of bailment.9
A consideration of the concept of possession' 0 is essential to an analysis
of bailments. Possession of a chattel requires physical control plus an intent
to excerise that control.' Historically, the question of whether there was a
delivery of possession was usually presented in clear-cut factual situations,
and the courts apparently had no difficulty in determining whether a bailment
existed. More recent cases, however, present different and more complicated
factual patterns which seem to lack some of the traditional characteristics
that were present in the earlier bailment cases.
One of these newer types is found in the parking lot cases.' 2 The most
common factual pattern is that of the metropolitan parking lot, open to the
public at hourly rates, where a patron leaves his car, including the keys, with
an attendant to be parked until called for.'8 These facts are generally held to
constitute a bailment of the car.1 4 On the other hand, where the facts do
not show such a clear delivery of possession, as where the customer parks
the car himself and keeps the keys, several courts have refused to call the
5. For a frequently cited case defining a constructive bailment, see Wentworth v.
Riggs, 159 App. Div. 899, 143 N.Y. Supp. 955 (1st Dep't 1913).
6. Grice v. Berkner, 148 Minn. 64, 180 N.W. 923 (1921) (owner of building, holding
chattel after lease expired, termed an "involuntary depositary") ; Foster v. Fidelity Safe
Deposit Co., 264 Mo. 89, 174 S.W. 376, L.R.A. 1916A 655 (1915) (bank held bailee of
money "mislaid" on its premises) ; Meekins v. Simpson, 176 N.C. 130, 96 S.E. 894
(1918) (finder of lost dog, bailee for owner) ; Foulke v. New York Consol. R.R., 228 N.Y.
-269, 127 N.E. 237, 9 A.L.R. 1384 (1920) (subway company held bailee of package
"mislaid" on train). See Deaderick v. Oulds, 86 Tenn. 14, 19, 5 S.W. 487, 488 (1887)
(owner of premises called a "quasi-bailee" for mislaid articles).
7. Gilson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 86 N.J.L. 446, 92 Atl. 59 (1914) (constructive
delivery said to require an intention on the part of the parties to transfer exclusive
possession). A constructive delivery must be distinguished from a constructive bailment.
No delivery is needed in the latter. See Wentworth v. Riggs, 159 App. Div. 899, 143
N.Y. Supp. 955 (1st Dep't 1913).
8. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Baker, 118 Ga. 809, 45 S.E. 673 (1903) ; GilsQn v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 86 N.J.L. 446, 92 Atl. 59 (1914); Wentworth v. Riggs, 159 App.
Div. 899, 143 N.Y. Supp. 955 (1st Dep't 1913); Broaddus v. Commercial Nat. Bank,
113 Okla. 10, 237 Pac. 583, 42 A.L.R. 1331 (1925) ; Lord v. Oklahoma State Fair Ass'n,
95 Okla. 294, 219 Pac. 713 (1923).
9. x parte Mobile Light & R.R., 211 Ala. 525, 101 So. 177, 34 A.L.R. 921 (1924);
Gilson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 86 N.J.L. 446, 92 Atl. 59 (Sup. Ct. 1914); Broaddus v.
Commercial Nat. Bank. 113 Okla. 10, 237 Pac. 583, 42 A.L.R. 1331 (1925) ; Zweeres v.
Thibault, 112 Vt. 264, 23 A.2d 529, 138 A.L.R. 1131 (1942) ; 6 Am. Jun., Bailnmnts a 65
(Rev. ed. 1950).
10. Riggs v. Bank of Camas Prairie, 34 Idaho 176, 200 Pac. 118, 18 A.L.R. 83 (1921).
11. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 216 (1934). For a general discussion see Shartel, Meanings of Possession, 16 MixN. L. REv. 611 (1932).
12. See Jones, The Parking Lot Cases, 27 GEro. L.J. 162 (1938).
13. See, e.g., Sandier v. Commonwealth Station Co., 307 Mass. 470, 30 N.E.2d 389,
131 A.L.R. 1170 (1940).
14. Sandier v. Commonwealth Station Co., supra note 13; Galowitz v. Magner, 208
App. Div. 6, 203 N.Y. Supp. 421 (2d Dep't 1924).
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transaction a bailment, but instead call it a rental of or privilege to use
parking space.'5
Another distinct class is made up of the safe-deposit cases.' 6 The fact
pattern usually found is that of a bank or trust company which leases to a
patron for an agreed rental a safe-deposit box located in the bank's vault.
The dual key system is commonly used, the bank retaining the master key,
while the lessee keeps the particular key which fits his box. 17 Whether bailment principles should be applied to these facts has presented a debatable
queston for the courts,' but an impressive majority now recognizes that the
relationship between the bank and the patron is that of bailee-bailor.19 However, a few cases have held that the relationship is analogous to that of landlord
-tenant or lessor-lessee. 20
The other class is that of the check room or locker cases, some of which
are analogous to the instant case. These cases present many factual variations,
such as delivery of garments to a check room attendant, 21 delivery of valuables
in an envelope or other receptacle at a bath house, 22 or the leaving of clothes in
a locker at a bath house or swimming pool. 23 Although some of these cases
clearly involve bailments, others are not so easily classified.
In a study of these three classes, it appears that the courts still use the
traditional test for an actual bailment, although the various fact situations have
complicated its application. The test is still basically whether there has been a
delivery of possession. Having little precedent with reference to these locker
cases, 24 the New Jersey court in the instant case was faced with the question
15. Ex parte Mobile Light &R.R., 211 Ala. 525, 101 So. 177, 34 A.L.R. 921 (1924);
Lord v. Oklahoma State Fair Ass'n, 95 Okla. 294, 219 Pac. 713 (1923). Also see Suits
v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 213 Mo. App. 275, 249 S.W. 656 (1923).
16. See Notes, 138 A.L.R. 1137, 1142 (1942), 133 A.L.R. 279 (1941), 42 A.L.R.
1304 (1926), 40 A.L.R.874 (1926).
17. See, e.g., National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 34 Sup. Ct. 209, 58 L.
Ed. 504 (1914).
18. See Note, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 325 (1936).
19. Morgan v. Citizens' Bank, 190 N.C. 209, 129 S.E. 585, 42 A.L.R. 1299 (1925);
Trainer v. Saunders, 270 Pa. 451, 113 Atl. 681, 19 A.L.R. 861 (1921) ; Young v. First
Nat. Bank, 150 Tenn. 451, 265 S.W. 681 (1924), 40 A.L.R. 868 (1926). Some courts
have said that it is not necessary to define the exact legal relationship of the parties,
but they have held nevertheless that the bank is liable as if it were a bailee. See, e.g.,
McDonald v. Perkins & Co., 133 Wash. 622, 234 Pac. 456, 40 A.L.R. 859 (1925).
20. Wells v. Cole, 194 Minn. 275, 260 N.W. 520 (1935). Also see Glynn v. Mercantile Safe Deposit Co., 159 App. Div. 98, 143 N.Y. Supp. 849, 851 (1st Dep't 1913) ; Carples
v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., 240 N.Y. 187, 148 N.E. 185, 186, 39 A.L.R. 1211 (1925)
(showing the uncertain position of the New York courts). See Note, 10 CORNELL L.Q.
255 (1925) (urging that safe-deposit transactions are not bailments); and Note, 11
MINN. L. REv. 440 (1927) (arguing for a licenor-licensee relationship).
21. Samples v. Geary, 292 S.W. 1066 (Mo. 1927).
22. Carter v. Borough of Allenhurst, 100 N.J.L. 138, 125 Atl. 117, 34 A.L.R. 759
(1924).
23. Fischer v. Roman Baths Co., 182 N.Y. Supp. 890 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
24. Dyer v. American Locker Co., 72 N.Y.S.2d 451 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Cornelius v.
Berinstein, 183 Misc. 685, 50 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ; Kelemen v. American Locker
Co., 182 Misc. 1058, 47 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. City Ct. 1944). These New York cases,
although they in turn cite no cases in point, support the New Jersey court in the instant case.
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of whether to apply the common law bailment theory to a modem transaction
which, even more than the safe-deposit cases, lacked exclusiveness of possession in the alleged bailee. The court refused to apply the bailment principles to
the fact pattern in this case, saying that the plaintiff, rather than the defendant, retained primary physical control of the package.
The importance of classifying fact patterns as bailments rather than other
transactions lies in the difference in procedure involved in proving negligence.
Except in cases of misdelivery by the bailee, 25 where an absolute liability is
imposed, the bailee is liable only where he is at fault. 20 In an action against
the bailee for negligence, the majority rule places the ultimate burden of proving negligence upon the plaintiff-bailor, 27 but at the same time this rule aids
the plaintiff-bailor with a rebuttable presumption of negligence, arising upon a
28
showing of a bailment and the bailee's failure to return the object. The
minority rule places the burden of proving freedom from negligence upon the
bailee.29 Thus, under either rule it is important to the plaintiff in the instant
and similar cases to establish a bailment because under either rule he makes a
prima facie case by simply proving a bailment and the bailee's failure to return.
If the plaintiff cannot establish a bailment, he may still recover in an action
for negligence, apart from bailment principles; but then he must prove as
a part of his prima facie case that the defendant's negligence caused the loss
of the chattel. Therefore, the bailment concept is the vital factor in determining
which of the two parties must try to explain the mysterious disappearance
and loss of the bailed chattel.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INFRINGEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS BY
PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS-CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER FEDERAL STATUTE
Plaintiffs, citizens of the United States, were members of a political club
organized to participate in the election of officials of the United States and to
engage in public meetings for the discussion of national public issues, including
the international -and foreign policies of the United States. They sued de25. Lookwood v. Bull, 1 Cow. 322 (N.Y. 1823).

26. Sawyer v. Wilkinson, 166 N.C. 497, 82 S.E. 840, L.R.A. 1915B 295 (1914).

27. See, e.g., Bohmont v. Moore, 138 Neb. 784, 295 N.W. 419, 133 A.L.R. 270 (1940),
aff'd 141 Neb. 91 (1942) ; Morgan v. Citizens' Bank, 190 N.C. 209, 129 S.E. 585, 42 A.L.R.

1299 (1925).

28. The bailee may overcome this presumption of negligence by introducing some

evidence that he used care. See note 27 supra. Also see 6 Am. JUR., Baibncnis §§ 377
et seq. (Rev. ed. 1950).
29. See the following Minnesota cases, holding that the entire burden of proof shifts
to the bailee, where the bailor shows a failure to return. This requires the bailee to
prove his freedom from negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. Hod v. Flour
City Fuel & Transfer Co., 144 Minn. 280, 175 N.W. 300 (1919) ; Rustad v. Great Northern

Ry., 122 Minn. 453, 142 N.W. 727 (1913). Both the majority rule, with its rebuttable
presumption, and the minority rule are based upon the theory that the bailee, having
possession of the object, is better able to explain facts concerning its disappearance.
See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 87 (1936).
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fendants under the Ku Klux Klan statute' to recover damages for breaking up
by threats of violence, pursuant to a conspiracy, a meeting of the club. The
district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it did not state a
cause of action under the statute, Held, (2-1), reversed. The statute gives a
right of action against private individuals for infringement of civil rights
necessarily associated with Federal citizenship. Hardyman v. Collins, 183 F.2d

308 (9th Cir. 1950).
Whether the statute authorizes a civil suit for damages against private
individuals for interfering, pursuant to a conspiracy, with an assemblage oi
citizens to discuss United States foreign policy and to petition the-national
government for redress of grievances is the question presented by the instant
case. This, in turn involves: (a) whether the statute applies to the action
of private individuals and (b) whether the breaking up of such an assemblage
is an act in furtherance of a conspiracy having the purpose of depriving any
person of the "equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws,"- whereby another is deprived of "having and exer'2
cising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States."
The court in the instant case -held that the legislative history of the
statute reflects congressional intent t6 protect directly the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, 3 and that the right to assemble for
the purpose of discussing the policies of the Federal Government and petition1. 17 STAT. 13 (1871), 8 U.S.C.A. § 47(3) (1942) : "If two or more persons in any
State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of
another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class
of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities
of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or
Territory the equal piotection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent
by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving
his gupport or advocacy in a legal manner, toward o" in favor of the lection of any lawfully qualified person as an elector. for President or Vice President,.cir as a Member of
Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account
of such support or adiocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section," if one
or more persons engaged therein, do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the
object of such "conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or. property, or deprived of havifig and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the' United States,
the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury oi d'eri'vation; against any one or more of the conspirators."
2. Ibid. This statiitfe had been c6nstrued only in Love v. Chandler, 124 F.2d 785 (8th
Cir. 1942) and Viles V. Symid,129' F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1942). 'In neither case was a
federal right found to be vi6lated.: Successive questions arise in determining whether
given conduct falls within the'scope of the statute. Can private persons be the conspirators?
Can private persons be the conspirators when the object of the conspiracy is unrelated
to state action or inaction? If private persons can be the conspirators and the object need
not be tied to state action, must the act in furtherance of'the conspiracy have the effect
of, or be directed toward, state action depriving a person of havin and exercising any
right or privilege of 'a citizen of the United States? See Screw 'v. United States, 325
U.S. 91, 65 Sup. Ct. 1031, 89 L. Ed. 1495, 162 A.L.R. 1330 (1945) ; Hale, Unconstitutional
Acts as Federal Crines, 60 HARV. L. REv. 65 (1946). .
3. Citing CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68, 391, 394, 487, 607-08, app. 68-69,
166-67, 181 (1871). In United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 1 Sup. Ct. 601, 27 L. Ed.
290 (1882), the Cburt held that a statute identical in part 'with the statute here involved
was directed exclusively against the action of private persons.
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ing that government for redress of grievances is an attribute of national citizenship. 4 The court reasoned that "the violation by an individual of a right which
is enjoyed equally by other citizens is the denial of an 'equal' privilege or
immunity."5
The statute thus interpreted presents the problem of whether Congress
could constitutionally enact it. The court found in the "necessary and proper"
clause of the Constitution6 the source of congressional authority to enact the
statute here involved.7 The court distinguishes those rights comprehended in
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
which are "subject to federal protection only as against state action" and
"[a]nother, much narrower set of rights [which] is subject to federal protection from invasion by individuals." s This narrower set of rights,9 including the
right of citizens peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress
for redress of grievances, exists as an attribute of national citizenship apart
from the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus the court does not depart from the traditional holdings that rights
provided for in the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment can be protected by the Federal Government only against state action. The court in effect
is holding only that Congress under the necessary and proper clause may
create an action for the recovery of damages where individuals deprive citizens
of their federal rights. This view follows a long recognized development of
congressional legislation providing criminal sanctions against "conspiracy
against rights of citizens."'1
The scope of rights protected under the doctrine that Congress may
create an action for damages where individuals deprive citizens of their federal
4. Citing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1876) : "The

right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a
redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the
national government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of a government, republican
in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in
respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. If it had been alleged
in these counts [of the indictment] that the object of the defendants was to prevent a
meeting for such a purpose, the case would have been within the statute, and within
the scope of the sovereignty of the United States."
5. 183 F.2d at 312. The dissenting judge, 183 F.2d at 315-16, relied on the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835 (1883), for the view that
although private persons might conspire to impede, hinder, interfere with, or interrupt
the free exercise of a constitutionally protected right or privilege they could not deprive
others of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges under the laws.
6. U.S. CoNsT., Art. I, § 8, cl.18.
7. The dissenting judge agreed that Congress could constitutionally enact a statute
creating an action for damages in situations such as involved here.
8. 183 F2d at 312.
9. 183 F.2d at 313. These rights include: right to vote for federal offices, Ex partc
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 4 Sup. Ct. 152, 28 L. Ed. 274 (1884); right to enjoy the
privileges granted by the homestead laws, United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 5 Sup.
Ct. 35, 28 L. Ed. 673 (1884) ; the right to protection from attack while in the custody of
a federal marshal, Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 12 Sup. Ct. 617, 36 L. Ed. 429
(1892) ; the right to inform federal officers of violations of federal law, In re Quarles,
158 U.S. 532, 15 Sup. Ct. 959, 39 L. Ed. 1080 (1895).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1948). See cases cited in note 9, supra.
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rights will require later delineation, but doubtless the number of such rights
is small. During the past 80 years the Supreme Court has found only four
such rights" (and by way of dictum a fifth, the right involved here) for
protection under an appropriate criminal statute. The rights that have been
recognized are those involving the relationship of the citizen to the Federal
Government and not rights as among citizens. It seems unlikely that the Court
would recognize a group of federal rights of citizens that would be protected
in a civil action for damages that it has failed to recognize in criminal pro2
ceedings.1
The present decision reaches the same result as those cases that advance
the proposition that Congress may directly protect citizens in the exercise of
their rights under the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment against
violation by individuals as well as states. 13 Thus, the claim for congressional
power might be based on the enforcing section of the Fourteenth Amendment
or, as here, the necessary and proper clause. To find the congressional power
in this latter clause requires the discovery of some other power which the
clause can carry into execution. Should that other power be the inherent
power of Congress to protect rights involved in the governmental process, or
the relationship of citizens to their government, perhaps no broad expansion
of power may be expected. But to assume that the necessary and proper clause
applies to the enforcing section of the Fourteenth Amendment might well
open the constitutional door to far-reaching federal legislation.
Although it has been suggested that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended that it would authorize Congress to protect the rights of citizens
against violation by individuals as well as by states,' 4 to assert this claim
for congressional power would require the reversal of the long accepted
doctrines explaining 'the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 5 The
11. See note 9, supra.
12. There is no distinction in the power of Congress to declare given conduct a crime
and to give to a person injured by such conduct an action for damages. This is true in
spite of certain standards of definiteness that might be required in the wording of criminal
statutes. See Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 Sup. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed.
322 (1926) ; Quarles, Some Statutory Construction Problents and Approaches in Criminal
Law, 3 VAD. L. Ray. 531, 539-43 (1950).
13. Williams v. United States, 179 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1950); Powe v. United
States, 109 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1940). But cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct.
836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948), 2 VAND. L. Rv. 119.
14. E.g., CARR, FEDERAL PRoTEcTox OF Civiri RIGHTS 36 (1947); FLACK, THE
AnoPTIoN OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDAIENT 277 (1908); SwisnEa,
AmERICAN CoilSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 329-34 (1943); Hale, Rights Under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments Against Injuries Inflicted by Private Individuals, 6 LAw. GuMDn
REv. 627 (1946).
15. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 Sup. Ct. 842, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948):
"Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said
to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful." The Court cites United States v. Harris, 106 U.S.
629, 1 Sup. Ct. 601, 27 L. Ed. 290 (1883) and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,
23 L. Ed. 588 (1876) in support of its position. The Court in these cases apparently made
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Supreme Court continues in the view that the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment relates only to state action. 16 Early cases construing statutes
which attempted to implement the Civil War Amendments did not consider
the possibility that Congress might protect rights provided for in such amend17
ments on the basis of the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL-ACTION FOR
STATUTORY PENALTY UNDER PRICE ..CONTROL ACT AS "SUIT AT
COMMON LAW"
The United States brought an action to recover treble the amounts received by defendant as rent in excess of the maximum fixed by authority of the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.1 The plaintiff moved to strike defendant's demand for trial by jury. Held, motion denied and an order entered for jury trial. A suit for a penalty under a statute falls within the
scope of the common law action of debt; hence, under the Seventh Amendment, it is triable by jury as a matter of right. United States v. Jepson, 90
F. Supp. 983 (D.N.J. 1950).
The Seventh Amendment has preserved in "suits at common law" the
right to trial by jury 2 In determining the application of the Amendment,
the federal courts have declared that the right to jury trial is that which
existed under the English common law when the Amendment was adopted.3
Thus it does not apply to actions equitable in nature, to cases in admiralty,
to certain statutory proceedings, nor to proceedings unknown to the common
4
law.
The instant case raises the issue of whether an action brought under a
statute providing for the payment of a penalty (here, triple the amount of
overcharges) is such a suit as at common law would have been triable by
no attempt to use extrinsic aids in statutory interpretation to ascertain the intent of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. See SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVEOPLNT 338 (1943).

16. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948).
17. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835 (1883): "Of
course, no one will contend that the power to pass it [the statute] was contained in the
Constitution before the adoption of the last three amendments." The Court in United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 636, 1 Sup. Ct. 601, 27 L. Ed. 290 (1883), observed that
only Art. IV, § 2, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments "in the
remotest degree" have any reference to the power of Congress to pass the statute under
consideration.
1. 56 STAT. 25 (1942), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. Arr. § 902(b) (Supp. 1950); 56
34 (1942), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 925(e) (Supp. 1950).

STAT.

2. U.S. Co-sT. A.mEiD. VII.

3. See, e.g., Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 55 Sup. Ct.
890, 79 L. Ed. 1636 (1935); United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 41 F. Supp. 805
(E.D.N.Y. 1941); Long v. Jordan, 29 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Cal. 1939); Simmons v.
United States, 29 F. Supp. 285 (W.D. Ky. 1939); 3 MOORE, FEnaDERL PRAcrcE 3008-10

(1938).
4.

ROTSCHAEFER, HANDOOK OF AAMERICAN

50 C.J.S., Juries § 10(b) (1947).
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jury. In the leading case of Fleitnann v. Willsbach Street Lighting Co., 5
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking of the antitrust laws, said, "[B]ut we agree
with the courts below that when a penalty of triple damages is sought to be
inflicted, the statute should not be read as attempting to authorize liability
to be enforced otherwise than through the verdict of a jury in a court of
common law." 6 In subsequent antitrust cases, the courts have followed this
position and have granted trial by jury. 7 In two of the three cases under
the Housing and Rent Act of 19478 where the issue has been presented, the
courts have allowed trial by jury.9 The third court, without citing any
authority for its position, denied jury trial upon two grounds. First, it concluded, the treble damages are sought merely as an incident to the equitable
relief afforded by the Act, and can be awarded by the court sitting as a court
of equity without a jury.10 This argument is contrary to previous decisions
under the Housing and Rent Act, and it probably has been effectually disposed
of with regard to the Price Control Act (involved in the principal case) by
some language of the United States Supreme Court. 12 Secondly, however,
the court insisted that "the treble damage feature of these actions is in its
entirety a creature of the statute and by no stretch of the imagination existed
at the common law."' 3
In the instant case, the government relied on Creedon.v. Arielly,14 where
the court made the similar statement, by way of dictum, that under the Emergency Price Control Act there is no right to jury trial, asserting that the
rights under the Act were not "generally known and enforced at common
law."' 5 A critical examination indicates that this argument is false. The
common law provided the actions of debt and assumpsit as the proper method
of recovery where a penalty was inflicted by statute to be paid to the party
5. 240 U.S. 27, 36 Sup. Ct. 233, 60 L. Ed. 505 (1916).
6. Id. at 29.

7. Container Co. v. Carpenter Container Corp., 9 F.R.D. 261 (D. Del. 1949); Ring
v. Spina, 166 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1948); Hartford-Empire Co. v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,
3 F.R.D. 50 (W.D. Pa. 1943).
8. 61 STAT. 193 (1947), as amended, 62 STAT. 93 (1948), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 1881
et seq. (Supp. 1950).
9. United States v. Strymish, 86 F. Supp. 999 (D. Mass. 1949); United States v.
Hart, 86 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Va. 1949). Contra: United States v. Friedman, 89 F.
Supp. 957 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
10. United States v. Friedman, 89 F. Supp. 957, 961 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
11. United States v. Strymish, 86 F. Supp. 999, 1000 (D. Mass. 1949); United
States v. Hart, 86 F. Supp. 787, 788 (E.D. Va. 1949).
12. "To the extent that damages might properly be awarded by a court of equity
in the exercise of jurisdiction under § 205 (a) . . ., § 205 (e) supersedes that possibility
Moreover, a court giving
and provides an exclusive remedy relative to damages ....
relief under § 205(e) acts as a court of law rather than as a court of equity." Porter v.
Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 401, 402, 66 Sup. Ct. 1086, 90 L. Ed. 1332 (1946).
This view also prevails in the suits under antitrust laws. Fleitman v. Wellsbach
Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27, 36 Sup. Ct. 233, 60 L. Ed. 505 (1916) ; Ring v. Spina,
166 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1948).
13. See note 10, supra.
14. 8 F.R.D. 265 (W.D.N.Y. 1948).
15. Id. at 268, quoting from Agwilines, Inc. v. Nat. Labor Relations Board, 87 F.2d
146, 150 (5th Cir. 1936).
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aggrieved, and no other mode of recovery was prescribed.' 0 Many early
American cases have held that where a penalty is given by a statute, debt
will lie.-" While price control statutes and penalties thereunder may have
been unknown to the common law, the suit for penalty was firmly established
and recovery provided for by the action of debt or general assumpsit-and in
the United States, at least, was triable by jury. 8
The theory of the instant case appears sound; it follows and explains
the Fleitmann case. No criterion in determining "suits at common law" is
available other than that of applying a particular form of action to the fact
transaction; ejectment"9 and assumpsit 20 have been so used to guarantee jury
trial. The fact that the action owes its existence to a statute should cause no
trouble. "[W]hen a federal statute embraces a common-law form of action,
that action does not lose its identity merely because it finds itself enmeshed
2
in a statute." '
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-UNITED NATIONS CHARTER-APPLICATION
AS TREATY TO RENDER STATE LAW INVALID
Plaintiff brought an action to determine whether land purchased by him
in California escheated to the state under the Alien Land Law, which provides
for an escheat where land is bought by an alien ineligible for citizenship.
The lower court found that the land escheated. Held, reversed. The Alien
Land Law violates the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly pursuant to the Charter;
under the Federal Constitution the Charter, as a treaty, becomes the supreme
law of the land. Sei Fufii v.State, 217 P.2d 481, rehearing denied, 218 P.2d
5951 (Cal. App. 1950).
16. 1 CrrTY, TRPATIsE oN PLEADING AND PARTIES To AcTioNs, 125 (16th Am. ed.
1923). The theory behind the action was that every man as a member of society had
contracted to obey the legislature and any penalty or forfeiture imposed was a debt owed
by him. See 3 BL. Comm. *159-60.
17. Stockwell v. United States, 13 Wall. 531, 20 L. Ed. 491 (1871) ; United States
v. Willetts, 28 Fed. Cas. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1871); United States v. Bougher, 24 Fed.
Cas. 1205 (C.C.D. Ohio 1854); Jacob v. United States, 13 Fed. Cas. 267 (C.C.E.D.
Va. 1821) ; United States v. Allen, 24 Fed. Cas. 772 (C.C.D. Conn. 1810) (jury to assess
Ilamages). Originally, the action of debt was triable by wager of law, but since wager of
t
aw probably never had any existence in the United States, there would be no argunient on this basis for precluding jury trial in the instant case. See Childress v. Emory,
R Wheat. 642, 675, 5 L. Ed. 705 (U.S. 1823).
18. It is conceivable that an argument might be made that the action here is criminal
in nature and the penalty a fine. If such be the case, it may be classified as a petty
offense and summarily tried. On this point, see Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal
Offenses and the ConstitutionalGuaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. RFv. 917 (1926).
19. Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 11 Sup. Ct. 276, 34 L. Ed. 873 (1891) :
Wood v. Phillips, 50 F.2d 714 (4th Cir. 1931) ; Peterson v. Sucro, 93 F.2d 878 (4th
Cir. 1938).
20. Burnett v. Bush, 44 F. Supp. 390 (D.N.J. 1942).
21. 90 F. Supp. at 986.
1. In denying rehearing the court explains that it did not place reliance on the Declaration of Human Rights in reaching its conclusion and that reference was made to the Deela-
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The Alien Land Laws of California2 and other western states have been
upheld as constitutional 3 in that the denial to an alien ineligible for citizenship
of the right to own or lease agricultural property is both a valid exercise of
the state police power and a reasonable basis for classification as to property
ownership rights. 4 The court in the present case recognizes the existence of
what appears to be controlling precedent." It does not suggest that this
authority is no longer valid but gives distinctly different, and somewhat
questionable, reasons for its holding that the United Nations Charter, 6 "an
authority which for want of opportunity has not previously been made the
basis of a judicial determination of the question,"' invalidates the California
Alien Land Law.
The Constitution declares that all treaties made under the authority of
the United States shall be the supreme law of the land,8 a truism9 which the
court here has apparently taken at its face value.' 0 Whether a treaty might
be beyond the treaty-making power,"' and thus not binding upon the courts, is
an undetermined question;12 for all cases in point hold that a treaty, once
ration only to especially emphasize the purposes and guarantees of the Charter. 218 P.2d
595, 596, "The [proposed] Covenant [on Human Rights] is in contrast to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights approved by the General Assembly at Paris on December 10,
1948, since the Declaration was not drafted in the form of a treaty but as a declaration
setting forth a common standard of achievement." Simsarian, Proposed Human Rights
Covenant, 22 DEP'T STATE BULL. 945 (1950). For the status of the proposed Covenant
see 9 U.N. BurL. 213 (1950). See also Holman, Treaty Law-Making: A Blank Check
for Writing a New Constitution, 36 A.B.A.J. 707 (1950) ; Chafee, Legal Problems of
Freedom of Information in the United Nations, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 545 (1949).
2. CAL. GEr. LAWS, act 261, §§ 1-2 (1944), § 7 (Supp. 1945).
3. "The constitutionality of alien land laws has been the subject of attack for nearly
thirty years and, except for a few provisions not relating to the right of an alien to own
land, the attacks have failed." 217 P.2d at 483.
4. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 44 Sup. Ct. 15, 68 L. Ed. 255 (1923). For
subsequent cases involving the same question see e.g., Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258,
45 Sup. Ct. 490, 69 L. Ed. 944 (1925) ; Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326, 44 Sup. Ct. 115,
68 L. Ed. 323 (1923) ; Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 44 Sup. Ct. 21, 68 L. Ed. 278
(1923) ; Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313, 44 Sup. Ct. 112, 68 L. Ed. 318 (1923). Contra:
Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949) (Oregon Alien Land Law unconstitutional). But see Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647, 650, 68 Sup. Ct. 269,
276, 277, 92 L. Ed. 249, 259, 261 (1948), 36 CALiF. L. REv. 320 (dictum in concurring
opinions indicates California Alien Land Law is unconstitutional).
5. 217 P.2d at 484.
6. 59 STAT. 1035 (1945).

7. 217 P.2d at 484.
8. U.S. Co sT. Art. VI, § 2.

9. The supremacy clause "only declares a truth, which flows immediately and
necessarily from the institution of a national government." 2 STORY, THE CorsTTUrroN
§ 1837 (3d ed. 1858).
10. "The Charter has become 'the supreme Law of the Land ..
' 217 P.2d at 486.
11. U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 2. For some suggestions as to possible limits see 52 Am.
JuR., Treaties § 7 (1944) ; Notes, 134 A.L.R. 886 (1941), 4 A.L.R. 1388 (1919). See also
Holman, Treaty Law-Making: A Blank Check for Writing a New Constitution, 36,
A.B.A.J. 707 (1950); Johnson, The Federal Treaty Power: A Constitutional Wolf in
Sheep's Clothing, 11 ALA. LAW. 123 (1950).
12. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 40 Sup. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641 (1920) (a
treaty may authorize that which Congress alone cannot). But see Asakura v. Seattle, 265
U.S. 332, 341, 44 Sup. Ct. 515, 516, 68 L. Ed. 1041, 1044 (1924).
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executed, becomes the supreme law of the land. 13 The problem in the
instant case, therefore, is not the constitutionality of the Charter but is one of
determining when it, as a treaty, becomes binding on the courts as the supreme
law of the land. The court did not consider the question of self-execution, the
basis for distinguishing the effects of treaties after ratification by the Senate.
A self-executing treaty, one which operates of itself without the aid of
legislation, 14 automatically becomes the supreme law of the land within the
15
meaning of the supremacy clause once it has been ratified by the Senate. "But
when the terms of stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties
engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political,
not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the court."' 6 The language of the Charter relied
upon liy the court in the instant case 17 indicates a pledge on the part of the
signatory nation-states to take certain actions in the future, the basic quality
of an executory treaty,' 8 and it is therefore questionable whether a court may
rely upon it, in the absence of enabling legislation, as being the supreme
law of the land. 19
Should the United States Supreme Court review this case, the way lies
open for it to affirm the result without declaring" the Charter to be a self21
executing treaty.20 The Oregon Supreme Court, in a well-reasoned opinion,
recently held Oregon's Alien Land Law unconstitutional on the ground that
recent United States Supreme Court decisions have in effect overruled the
precedent of the older cases in point. The Oregon Court points out that in
22
the Supreme Court held invalid reTakahashi v.Fish & Game Comin'r
fishing licenses to aliens ineligible
commercial
of
strictions on the issuance
13. E.g., Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 44 Sup. Ct. 515, 68 L. Ed. 1041 (1924) ;
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 40 Sun. Ct. 382. 64 L. Ed. 641 (1920) ; Malorano v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 213 U.S. 268. 29 Sup. Ct. 424, 53 L. Ed. 792 (1909).
14. 52 Am. JuR., Treaties § 2 (1944).
15. For discussions of the problem of self-executing treaties see Chafec, Legal
Problems of Freedom of Information in United Nations, 14 LAW & CONTETAP PRoD.
545. 558 (1949) ; McDougal and Arens, The Genocide Convention and the Constitulion,
3 VAND. L. R v. 683, 692 (1950).
16. Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314, 7 L. Ed. 415, 435 (U.S. 1829).
17. "Among the Purposes and Principles found in Article I of Chapter I are 'To
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights . . . ; To achieve international cooperation . . . in promoting and encouraging

.'espect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion. . .

.'"

217 P.2d at 487.

18. "An executory treaty is one in which the terms of the stipulation import a
contract when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act." 52 Am. Jun.,
Treaties § 2 (1944). See also Note, 4 A.L.R. 1387 (1919).
19. The problem of self-execution of the Charter was a definite issue in the briefs
of both parties before the Supreme Court of California. 10 LAW GUiLD REv. 52 (1950).
20. For comments criticizing the holding in the present case and indicating 'what
might happen should the Supreme Court affirm, see Hardison, Whither Are We Drifthig
and If So to What Extent? 14 Ky. BAR J. 203 (1950) ; Notes, 36 A.B.A.J. 652 (1950), 13
GA. BAR J. 110 (1950).
21. Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579. 204 P.2d 569 (1949).
22. 334 U.S. 410, 68 Sup; Ct. 1138, 92 L. Ed. 1478, 36 CALiF. L. REv. 118 (1948).
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for citizenship; and that in Oyama v. California23 four concurring justices
favored holding the California Alien Land Law unconstitutional, and the
majority opinion assumed only for argument the validity of the statute. The
Oregon Court thus concludes that the Supreme Court no longer regards as
binding the older decisions in point. From this authority, and using the
Charter as a further strong indication of public policy, 24 the Supreme Court
could well affirm the result of the instant case and hold the Land Law invalid
as a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
CONTRACTS-CONSIDERATION-NEW AGREEMENT TO PAY LESS THAN
ORIGINAL CONTRACT PRICE
An owner of an orchard entered into a written contract with a fruit buyer
for the sale of all the fruit in the orchard for $70 a ton, buyer to pick when
fruit matured. After picking the best fruit, buyer became dissatisfied because much of the fruit had failed to mature properly. The parties thereafter
entered into an oral agreement setting the price of the remaining fruit at
$35 a ton. The seller sued on the written contract, and the buyer filed a
cross-action in which he alleged that the oral arrangement superseded the
written contract. Held, the oral agreement was invalid for lack of consideration since the buyer agreed to do nothing he was not already contractually
bound to do.' Moffitt v. Hieby, 229 S.W.2d 1005 (Tex. 1950).
The holding of the instant case represents a principle of law that is
adhered to by the vast majority of American courts, and apparently is firmly
entrenched in American jurisprudence. 2 However, several courts have recognized that the rule is harsh and oppressive, and-in many instances works
injustice.3 Accordingly, the courts have sought to escape the rigidity of
23. 332 U.S. 633, 68 Sup. Ct. 269, 92 L. Ed. 249, 36 C~A.iF. L. Ray. 320 (1948).
24. Thus the Ontario court, in Re Drummond and Wren, [1945] O.R. 777, relied
partially on the provisions of the U.N. Charter in determining the public policy of the
province, which was held to invalidate a racial restrictive covenant. In United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 62 Sup. Ct. 552, 86 L. Ed. 796 (1942), the Court holds that a state
law must yield when it is inconsistent with, or impairs the policy of, a treaty or of an
international compact or agreement.
1. This is an alternative holding, the main issue being whether, after a contract
of sale in which title passed, there was an implied warranty on the part of the seller
to water the trees so that the fruit would mature properly. This was disposed of in
favor of the seller.
Z E.g. Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 Fed. 99 (9th Cir. 1902) ; Watson
v. American Creosote Works, 184 Okla. 13, 84 P.2d 431 (1938) ; Barcroft v. Armstrong,
1In Miss. 565, 21 So.2d 817 (1945) ; 1 WILLisToN, CoNT AcTs § 130 (Rev..-ed. 1936);
17 C.J.S., Contracts § 112; 12 An. Jun., Contracts § 88 (1937).
.
3. "The rule and the reason were purely technical, and often fostered bad faith.
The history of judicial decisions upon the subject, has shown a constant effort to escape
from its absurdity and injustice." Harper v. Graham, 20 Ohio 105, 115 (1851). "[I]t
is believed the rule is adhered to in form, but there is apparently a progressive disposition to disregard it in spirit." Herman v, Schlesinger, 114 Wis. 382, 90 N.W. 460, 466
(1902).
"Turning now to the holdings of the American courts on this question, we
are profoundly and painfully impressed with the slavish adherence of the legal and judicial mind to precedent, or, in many cases, to what seems to be precedent only." Clayton
v. Clark, 74 Miss. 499, 21 So. 565, 568 (1897).
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the rule; and it will not be applied if the court can find from the circumstances
4
any detriment to the promisor or benefit to the promisee, however trifling.
It has been held that in instances where there is a disputed or unliquidated
claim, consideration is present when the creditor agrees to accept less than
5
his original claim and the debtor agrees to pay.o
Two principal arguments
are expounded in support of this view: (1) the first agreement is rescinded
by the second, leaving the parties Tfree to make any kind of arrangement
desired; (2) either party obligated under a contract may refuse to perform
and subject himself to a suit for damages, and when this privilege is relinquished there is consideration for the new agreement. Both of these views
have been adversely criticized by courts and legal writers.0 As to the first
view, "[Clalling an agreement an agreement for rescission does not do away
with the necessity of consideration, and .. .the total effect of the second
agreement is that one party promises to do exactly what he had previously
bound himself to do, and the other party promises to give an additional consideration therefor."' 7 Therefore, the first view is accurate only where it
is found as a fact that the parties were free for a moment from the obligations
of the original contract,8 but where this fact is found, the explanation seems
unnecessary. In criticism of the second rule it has been said that to hold that
a party to a contract has the option either to perform or pay damages is
to disregard the natural implication of a contractual relation and invite parties
to repudiate their obligations. 9
There has been a failure to analyze the true nature of the transaction. A
recent treatment of the subject proposes a new rational approach, 10 which
points to the fallacy in the reasoning of some courts-the assumption that
the giving up of an obligation involves the creation of another." The necessity of consideration for the creation of a contractual obligation is elementary;
but where no contractual obligations were created or intended to be created,
the application of rules of consideration only adds confusion. The attempt
4. E.g., Spann v. Baltzell, 1 Fla. 301, 46 Am. Dec. 346 (1847)

(transfer by debtor

to creditor of evidence of indebtedness of a third person is sufficient consideration);

Chicora Fertilizer Co. v. Dunan, 91 Md. 144, 46 Atl. 347 (1900) (payment before due is
beneficial to promise and furnishes consideration); Gilson v. Nesson, 198 Mass. 598,
84 N.E. 854, 17 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1208 (1908) (right given to mortgagee to collect rents
before due is sufficient consideration for mortgagee's promise to accept lesser amount
as full payment).
5. San Juan v. St. John's Gas Co., 195 U.S. 510, 25 Sup. Ct. 108, 49 L. Ed. 299

(1904) ; Tanner v. Merrill, 108 Mich. 58, 65 N.W. 664, 31 L.R.A. 171 (1895).
6. Shriner v. Kraft, 166 Ala. 146, 51 So. 884 (1909); King v. Duluth, M. & N.
Ry., 61 Minn. 482, 63 N.W. 1105 (1895); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 130A (Rev. ed.
1936) ; 13 C.J., Contracts § § 210, 211 (1917).
7. WILisTox, CONTRACTS § 130A at 447, 448 (Rev. ed. 1936).

8. Ibid.
9. King v. Duluth, M. & N. Ry., 61 Minn. 482, 63 N.W. 1105 (1895); see Parrot
v. Mexican Central Ry., 207 Mass. 184, 93 N.E. 590, 595 (1911) (rule recognized but
court refused to extend it) ; 29 B.U.L. Rv. 133 (1949).
10. Fmsox, THE RATIONAL BASIS

ANALYSIS 153 (1949).
11. Id. at 156.
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by the creditor or obligee to give up his claim or right involves a consensual
act, but the parties do not create or attempt to create a contractual obligation. 2
The creditor or obligee does not promise to do anything for which the debtor
must furnish consideration. It is conceded that by no act df paying less than
the amount of the claim can the debtor discharge his obligation. But should
not the creditor by his manifested consent be allowed to exchange the
claim for a lesser sum than he is due?
The transfer of any property right is a two step process-i.e., the transferor is divested of his interest, and the transferee is invested with the same
interest. The first step is the same in the case of a release by a creditor. The
second step is lacking, but this does not change the complexion of the attempted transfer. The debtor owed a duty to pay under the first contract.
When the creditor transfers part of his right to collect the full amount, the
right and the duty as to that part are both in the debtor and simply cancel
themselves out.13 The net effect is that the creditor has made a gift of part of
his claim to the debtor. That a chose in action can be the subject of a gift is
now established by authority. 14 Since it is valid for a creditor to give his
claim against a debtor to a third party, it is unreasonable and illogical to disallow the gift to the debtor himself.
CONTRACTS-DEFINITION OF TERMS-EFFECT OF PART
PERFORMANCE IN MAKING TERMS CERTAIN
Defendant, an automobile distributor, negotiated with plaintiff who
desired a dealership. Defendant wrote to plaintiff, saying that if he provided
a satisfactory sales room, service department and used car lot, he would give
plaintiff a dealership contract. Plaintiff agreed and spent considerable money
in remodeling a building and in purchasing tools. Defendant refused to
make plaintiff a dealer, and plaintiff brought suit for damages. Defendant
claimed that the terms of the offer were indefinite because they did not state
the time or place where the dealership was to be established, or the manner
in which it was to be conducted. Held, the offer was not indefinite, as the
terms were contained in the standard form for dealership contracts used by
that manufacturer. Plaintiff's acceptance created a bilateral contract, or
his part performance made a valid and binding one. Allen v. Elliot Reynolds
Motor Co., 230 S.W.2d 418 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1950).
12. Id. at 157.
13. Id. at 158.

14. Dinslage v. Stratman, 105 Neb. 274, 180 N.W. 81 (1920). Contra: Poff v.
Poff, 128 Va. 62, 104 S.E. 719 (1920). "In the United States... it is uniformly accepted
that there is nothing in the essential nature of choses in action rendering them incapable
of assignment by way of gift, and the only question is whether the means adopted by
the donor are effective to carry out his donative intent." BROWN, PERSONAL PRoPFrT-e
§ 58 at 167, 168 (1936). See Dickinson, Gratuitous PartialAssignments, 31 YA-E L..
1 (1921).
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As a general rule the terms of a contract must be definite or certain
in order for it to be enforceable.' . Since a contract is ordinarily composed
of an offer and acceptance, 2 the purported acceptance will not create a contract if the offer is indefinite or vague.8 The reasoning behind this requirement of certainty is that, unless the terms of the intended contract are definite,
there is no way for the court to enforce the contract by awarding either damages or specific performance 4
The courts follow no set rule in determining the degree of certainty
required, since each case must be, for the most part, decided on its own
iacts. The generally recognized test requires only "reasonable certainty.",;
There is a tendency to uphold a contract when a question of indefiniteness
arises so that the parties may be bound as they intended. 6 Courts frequently
will enforce a contract where there is some objective standard by which it
is possible to test the terms7 or even where some of the details are left for
future determination.8 The doctrines of part performance and promissory
1. Fzasox,

ed. 1936);

BASIS OF CONTRACTS
RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS

17 C.J.S., Contracts § 36 (1939).

53 (1949) ; 1

WILLISTON, CONTRACrS

§ 37 (Rev.

§ 32 (1932); 12 Am. JuR., Contracts § 64 (1938);

2. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 23 (Rev. ed. 1936); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTs § 22
(1932).
3. E.g., Harbot v. Pennsylvania R.R., 44 F. Supp. 319 (W.D.N.Y. 1942); Pepsi-

Cola Co. v. Wright, 187 Ga. 723, 2 S.E.2d 73 (1939); Fenton v. Federal St. Bldg.
Trust Co., 310 Mass. 609, 39 N.E.2d 414 (1942); Bogy v. Berlage, 265 App. Div. 249,
38 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1st Dep't 1942); Morrow v. De Vitt, 160 S.W.2d 977 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942); Schuehle v. Schuehle, 21 Wash. 2d 609, 152 P.2d 608 (1944). "',Anoffer usually
includes two things...: first, a definition of the terms of the proposed transaction ...
FERSON, BASIS OF CONTRACTS

85 (1949).

4. Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian, 147 F.2d 173, 158 A.L.R. 990 (2d Cir. 1945); Ford
Motor Co. v. Kirknyer Motor Co., 65 F. 2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1933); Nebraska Aircrift
Corporation v. Varney, 282 Fed. 608 (8th Cir. 1922) ; Carver v. Brien, 315 Ill.
App. 643,
43 N.E.2d 597 (1942) ; Lyons v. Jones, 22 Tenn. App. 262, 121 S.W.2d 125 (1938). The
measure of damages generally allowed in this type of case includes those expenses reasonably incurred in part performance less the value of materials left in plaintiff's hands. See
United States v. Behan, 110 U.S. 338, 4 Sup. Ct. 81, 28 L. Ed. 168 (1884) ; Brady v.
Oliver, 125 Tenn. 595, 147 S.W. i135, 41 L.R.A. (x.s.) 60 (1917); McCoRMicIK,
DAMAGES 582 (1935); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1363A (Rev. ed. 1936); RESTAT MENT, CONTRACTS § 333 (1932).
5. "The terms of a contract need be expressed only 'with reasonably certainty, and
what is reasonable in-any. case must depend upon the subject-matter of the agreement,
the purposes for which it was entered into, the situation and relations of the parties,
and the circumstances under which it was made."' Ward v. Ward, 94 Colo. 275, 30 P.2d
853, 854 (1934). See also Kann v. Wausau Abrasives Co., 85 N.H. 41, 153 Atl. 823
(1931); Castelli v. Tolibia, 83 N.Y.S.2d 554 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Harlow Pub. Co. v.
Patrick, 181 Okla. 83, 72 P.2d 511 (1937) ; Palmer v. Katz, 210 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ.
Ap~p. 1948).
6. See Roller v. California Pacific Title Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. 149 206 P.2d 694,
698 (1949) ; Vincent v. Palmer, 179 Md. 365, 19 A.2d 183, 187 (1941) ; Harlow Pub. Co.
v. Patrick, 181 Okla. 83, 72 P.2d 511, 512 (1937) ; Westland Const. Co. v. Chris Berg,
Inc., 215 P.2d 683, 689 (Wash. 1950).
7. Buggs v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1940) ; see Varney v. Ditmars,
217 N.Y. 223, 233, 111 N.E. 822, 826 (1916), 14 Micu. L. REv. 600, 3 VA. L. REv. 440
(dissenting opinion of Cardozo, J.).
8. Southwest Pipe Line Co. v. Empire Natural Gas Co., 33 F.2d 248 (8th Cir.
1929) ; Eno v. Prime Mfg. Co., 314 Mass. 686, 50 N.E.2d 401 (1943) ; Kirkley v. F. H.
*Roberts Co., 268 Mass. 246, 167 N.E. 289 (1929). See 13 RocxY MT. L. Rnv. 358 (1941).
9. Smithereen v. Renfro, 325 Ill.
App. 229, 59 N.E.2d 545 (1945); Henry Keep
Home v. Moore, 198 Okla. 198, 176 P.2d 1016 (1947); Harlow Pub. Co. v. Patrick,
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estoppel' ° have also been used to enforce vague contracts. The courts appear
to lower their requirements for certainty where the plaintiff seeks damages
rather than specific performance.".
The majority of cases involving dealership contracts hold that the contracts must be specific as to the details of price, amount of goods to be delivered, and the time and place where the contract is to be performed.' 2 In
these cases some courts indicate that they should not enforce a contract where
13
one of the parties has omitted making it definite through his own fault.

On the other hand, a Tfew courts have granted relief where it appeared that
the plaintiff did not have equal bargaining power with a manufacturer who
apparently dictated the terms of the contract.14 Since such dealership agreements usually involve a mass of detail, some of which pertains to unpredictable
future transactions, it would seem 'that some leniency should be allowed.' 5
Was the offer in the instant case sufficiently definite to lead to a valid
contract? There seems to have been much uncertainty as to its terms, especially
those pertaining to the conduct of the parties under the dealership arrangement.
The court held that the terms were made definite by means of the standard
form contract and said in the alternative -that "this acceptance completed
a bilateral contract between the parties, or at least his part performance made
the contract a valid and binding one."'16 However, if there was a definite
181 Okla. 83, 72 P.2d 511 (1937) ; Casper Natl. Bank v. Curry, 51 Wyo. 284, 65 P.2d
1116 (1937); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 106 (Rev. ed. 1936). See RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS § 33 (1932) which states that "An offer which is too indefinite to create a
contract if orally accepted, may, by entire or partial performance on the part of the
offeree, create a contract."
10. RESTATEmENT, CoNTAcTs § 90 (1932). See Curtis Candy Co." v. Silberman,
45 F.2d 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1930), where the court gives the indication that promissory
estoppel might apply in a proper case of sufficient reliance and injustice.
11. Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian, 147 F.2d 173, 158 A.L.R. 990 (2d Cir. 1945); Roller
v. California Pacific Title Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 149, 206 P.2d 694 (1949); Ward
v. Ward, 94 Colo. 275, 30 P.2d 853 (1934); Palmer v. Katz, 210 S.W.2d 451 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1948); Manss-Owens Co. v. H. S. Owens & Son, 129 Va. 183, 105 S.E. 543
(1921). See 36 CALin'. L. REv. 120 (1948).
12. Jordan v. Buick Motor Co., 75 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1935), 14 N.C.L. Riv. 87
(1936) (contract indefinite as to the price of -cars and the manner of servicing) ; Ford
Motor Co.'v. Kirkmyer Motor Co., 65 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1933) (agreement indefinite
as to number and price of cars); Nebraska Aircraft Corp. -v. Varney, 282 Fed.. 608
(8th Cir. 1922) (agreement uncertain as to the selection of the type of planes) ; International Shoe Co. v. Lacy, 114 Ind. App. 641, 53 N.E.2d 636 (1944) (contract iffdefinite
as to time, price, amount, and cancellation); George W. Wilcox, Inc. v. Shell Eastern
Petroleum Products, Inc., 283 Mass. 383, 186 N.E. 562, 13 B.U.L. REv. 705 (1933)
(quantity and price not fixed) ; Plant Mfg. Corp. v. Renner,'-214 App: Div. 606, 212 N.
Y. Supp. 710 (1st Dep't 1925) (uncertainty as to quantity and price); General Shoe
Corp. v. Hall, 123 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (no definite duration specified).
But cf. Sargent v. Drew-English, Inc., 12 Wash. 2d 320, 121 P.2d 373 (1942).
13. Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Motor Co., 65 F.2d 1001, 1006 (4th Cir. 1933>.
14. Abrams v. George E. Keith Co., 30 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1929) ; Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Coca-.Cola Co., 269 Fed. 796 (D. Del. 1920); Garlock v. Motz Tire & Rubber
Co., 192 Mich. 665, 159 N.W. 344 (1916).
15. See'Kane v. Chrysler, 80 F. Supp. 360, 363 (D. Del. 1948) ; Wood Motor Co. v.
Nebel, 232 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
16. 230 S.W.2d at 423. For this doctrine. of part- performance the court relies on
Hutchinson v. Dobson-Bainbridge Realty Co., 217 S.W.2d 6 .(Tenn. App. M.S. 1946),
2 VAND. L. REv. 698 (.1949), where part. performance was held. to stop the revocation
of an offer. In 2 VAND. L. REv. 698 (1949), this .case is regarded as. placing Tennessee in
the group following RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 45 (1932).
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offer contemplating a bilateral contract, then acceptance by the plaintiff
would have created a bilateral contract, and the part performance doctrine
as used would seem unnecessary. Since there was no showing that the plaintiff
was aware of the provisions of the standard form agreement, which was
actually a term of the original offer to enter into an executory contract, the
better ground for the holding would seem to be that plaintiff's part performance
cured the indefiniteness of the offer.17

COPYRIGHT-ARTIST'S RIGHTS IN PRODUCTION AFTER SALE"MORAL RIGHT" TO PREVENT DESTRUCTION
Plaintiff in performance of his contract with defendant church painted
a mural on the wall of the church building, obtained a copyright to it, and
assigned the copyright to defendant without limitations. Members of the
church subsequently objected to the mural and covered it with paint without
the consent of the plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that he has a continuing proprietary interest in his work to the extent necessary to protect his reputation
as an artist, which includes the right to prevent its destruction. In this action
he seeks to have the paint removed, or to be allowed to remove the painting,
or to recover damages. Held, plaintiff reserved no rights whatsoever in the
mural and therefore has no cause of action. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian
Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
At common law the creator of an intellectual production has a property
interest in his work before its publication.' This interest, called common law
copyright, is given to the author for the expenditure Of thought and labor,
and does not differ from any other property interest in the protection afforded
by the common law.2 The author has absolute control of his work, and he may
publish it, keep it private or destroy it. 3
In the United States there are two types of copyright, common law
copyright and statutory copyright. The common law copyright affords protection until the work is published. 4 On the other hand, statutory copyright
protects an author's interest after publication, though only for a limited
17. See note 9 supra. Whereas the part performance in Hutchinson v. Dobson-Bainbridge Realty Co., supra note 16, is used to prevent the revocation of an offer, the part
performance in the instant case ought to be relied on to elucidate the terms of the offer.
Thus the holding would be in accord with the rule of RESTATEmENT, CONMACTS § 33
(1932).
1. Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182, 30 Sup. Ct. 38, 54 L. Ed. 150
(1909); see Simonds, Natural Right of Property in Intellectual Production, 1 YAL-j
L.J. 16 (1891).
2. Paige v. Banks, 13 Wall. 608, 20 L. Ed. 709 (U.S. 1872); Stuff v. La Budde
Feed & Grain Co., 42 F. Supp. 493 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
3. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 194 At. 631 (1937).
4. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 32 Sup. Ct. 263, 56 L. Ed. 492 (1912) ; State
v. State Journal Co., 77 Neb. 752, 110 N.W. 763 (1906).
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period of time.5 Unless an author secures a statutory copyright he abandons
all interest in his work after its public dedication,6 which then permits an
unrestricted use of the subject matter by the public.
Many European countries have adopted the doctrine that an artist has
certain rights in his work over and above the privilege of exploiting it.8 The
creator has the right to prevent deformation, mutilation or other modification
of his work which may be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.9 In the instant
case the plaintiff's claim was based upon the doctrine that authors retain a
"moral right" in their work after they have parted with ownership. This
doctrine of "moral right," although recognized by the civil law, has not been
accepted by the courts in common law jurisdictions,' 0 where an absolute sale
without reservation constitutes an abandonment of all the artist's rights."
Thus, where an artist paints a picture for another and it is delivered and paid
for, the artist is held to lose all his rights in the picture in the absence of an
12
expressed reservation.
Although not expressly recognizing the "moral right" doctrine, the
common law courts have given relief to those whose works have been deformed
or altered where there is no longer copyright protection.' 3 This relief has been
sought under different theories, including libel,' 4 unfair competition' 5 and
5. 35 STAT. 1080 (1909), 17 U.S.C.A. § 23 (1946); Boucicault v. Wood, 3 Fed.
Cas. 988, No. 1,693 (C.C.N.D. I1. 1867); Morton v. Raphael, 334 I1. App. 399, 79
N.E.2d 522 (1948).
6. Cases cited note 5 supra.

7. Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321 (2d Cir. 1904) ; Kurfiss
v. Cowherd, 233 Mo. App. 397, 121 S.W.2d 282 (1938). See also Warner, Protection of
the Content of Radio and Television Programs by Common Law Copyright, 3 V~A.
L. REv. 209 (1950).
8. 1 LADAs, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY

581 (1938).

9. 1 LADAS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 576. It has been suggested that moral right
includes prohibition against all injuries to the creator's personality. Roeder, The Doctrine
of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators,53 HARv. L. Rzv.
554, 566 (1940).
10. Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947) ; accord, Pushman v. New
York Graphic Society, Inc., 25 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. 1941). See also 2 LADAs, op,. cit.
supra note 8, at 802.
11. Pushman v. New York Graphic Society, Inc., 25 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
In this case the plaintiff sold a painting to X without reservation and X permitted the
defendants to reproduce it. Plaintiff sought to enjoin the reproduction, alleging that it
would cheapen his reputation and the value of his creative works in the future. The
court treated the painting as an ordinary chattel and refused to recognize the psychological
injuries claimed by the plaintiff. Contrast this situation with that where a person sends
a private letter to another and is held to retain the right to reproduce. Cf. Baker v. Libbie,
210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912).
12. Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 25 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), aff'd,
108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939) ; Werckmeister v. Springer Lithographing Co., 63 Fed. 808
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1894).
13. Prouty v. National Broadcasting Co., 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1939) ; Drummond v. Altemus, 60 Fed. 338 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1894); Packard v. Fox Film Corp., 207
App. Div. 311, 202 N.Y. Supp. 164 (1st Dep't 1923); Royle v. Dillingham, 53 Misc.
383, 104 N.Y. Supp. 783 (Sup. Ct. 1907).
14. Harris v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, 43 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y.
1942). Plaintiff sold all rights in a story written by her to defendant, who made the
story into a movie and gave exclusive screen credit to a third party. Plaintiff sued
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right of privacy.' 6 There seems to have been no previously reported case in
the United States involving the complete destruction or obliteration of an
artist's work. The right to prevent deformation is said not to include the right
to prevent destruction because deformation may injure the reputation of the
artist by representing him to be the creator of work which is not his own,
whereas total destruction cannot injure his reputation.' 7
It thus appears that neither the law of the United States nor the civil
law affords an artist a remedy for the total destruction of his work after all
his rights have been released.' 8 However, had the plaintiff in this case been
able to remove the mural from the wall without damage to the defendant's
property, it is arguable that the result should have been different. If the
defendant did not want the picture and was going to destroy it, it would seem
harsh not to give the plaintiff an opportunity to remove the mural, provided
he offered to compensate the defendant. Whether the compensation should
be the reasonable value of the work or a refund of the purchase price would
probably depend on the facts of the particular case; but in all events, it should
include the cost of removal.

CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-EFFECTS

OF VIOLATION

OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT ON JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS
Defendant was arrested by federal officers and his room was searched in
a manner admittedly illegal. Represented by counsel, he entered a plea of
guilty to charges of violating the National Stolen Property Act and was
sentenced. A motion to vacate the sentence on the ground that the illegal
search and seizure deprived the court of jurisdiction was denied, and defendant
appeals. Held, affirmed. - There was no casual connection between the undefendant for failure to give her screen credit. The court held this not to be libelous
per se, and, without a pleading of special damages, not to constitute libel.

15. Prouty v. National Broadcasting Co., 26 F. Supp 265 (D.Mass. 1939). Plaintiff

alleged she was the author of a novel and that the defendant, without her consent, had
broadcast scenes purporting to be events in the life of the heroine of plaintiff's book; the
broadcasts were alleged-to be an artistic degradation of plaintiff's work and an injury
to her reputation. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, basing its decision on unfair competition.
16. Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912). The plaintiff, as executor
of the will of decedent, sought an injunction to prevent the defendant from publishing
and selling autographed letters of his testatrix written to a cousin about domestic and
business affairs. The court granted the injunction, holding that plaintiff retained the
exclusive right of publication. See, also, Ellis v. Hurst, 66 Misc. 235, 121 N.Y. Supp.
438 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
"The common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily,
to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others."
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rsv. 193, 198 (1890).
17. Roeder, supra note 9, at 569.
18. Under similar facts a French court held that an artist could not recover when
murals painted by him on the walls of a church were destroyed. Lacasse et Welcome
v. Abb6 Qu6nard, Cour de Paris, April 27, 1934, D.H, 1934. 385, cited in Roeder, supra

note 9, at 569
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constitutional search and seizure and the conviction. United States v. Sturm,

180 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 986 (1950).
A judgment and sentence rendered by a court having no jurisdiction is
void. 1 A court which has had jurisdiction may lose it if certain constitutional
rights are denied to the defendant.2 The instant case seems to limit.this loss of
jurisdiction to those situations in which there is a causal connection between-the
deprivation of constitutional rights and the conviction. It is well recognized
that one may waive a constitutional right if he does so competently and intelligently.3 Thus, where the defendant voluntarily entered a plea of guilty and
was familiar with the consequences, the plea was deemed a-waiver of his right
4
to counsel.
In the instant case the defendant contends that .because his constitutional
guarantee against illegal search and seizure was violated the trial court had no
jurisdiction to entertain his plea of guilty and to render judgment and sentence
thereon.5 In the cases cited by the defendant to support this contention there
was a causal connection between the deprivation of constitutional rights and
the conviction.0 The court apparently concedes that had there been such a
connection here, then the. lower court would have lost jurisdiction. No causal
connection is evident, however, because the conviction was based entirely on
the plea of guilty; and the illegally-obtained evidence was never introduced
against the defendant. The present court based its decision upon this lack of
causal connection between the violation of the 4th Amendment, and the con-

viction.
In Taylor v. Hudspeth,7 the court refused to release the defendant in a
habeas corpus proceeding because he had waived his right against-illegal search
and seizure by his failure to make timely motion to suppress the evidence, and
by his subsequent plea of guilty. Most cases contain language similar to that
1. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 32 Sup. Ct,.406, 56 L. Ed.
760 (1912) ; In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 8 Sup. Ct. 482, 31 L. Ed. 402 (1888) ; Wilcox
v. Jackson ex dem. M'Connel, 13 Pet. 498, 10 L. Ed. 264 (U.S. 1839) ; Fueller . Justice's
N O'
Court of Encinitas, 134 Cal. App. 305, 25 P.2d 248 (1933) ; BRowN, JURiSDicTiOe
CouRTs

§ 97 (1891).

2. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 Sup. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R.
357 (1938) ; Bayless v. Johnston, 48 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Cal. 1943) ; Miskimins v. Shaver,
8 Wyo. 392, 58 Pac. 411, 49 L.RA. 831 (1899).
3. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 2; Moore.v. Aderhold, 108 F.2d 729, 732 (10th Cir.
1939) ; Peters v. United States, 97 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1938).
4. Cooke v. Svope, 28 F. Supp. 492 (W.D. Wash. 1939, aff'd, 109 F.2d 955 (9th
Cir. 1940).
5. A second contention made by the defendant was that he was under a misapprehension of his rights. The court disposed of this on the ground that he was at all times
represented by presumably competent counsel. 180 F.2d at 416.
6. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 Sup. Ct. 472, 84 L. Ed. 716 (1940)
(conviction based on coerced confession) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 Sup. Ct.
1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938) (accused denied assistance of counsel) ; Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 Sup. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682 (1936) (conviction based on
extorted confession) ; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 Sup. Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed: 791,
98 A.L.R. 406 (1935) (conviction based on testimony known by prosecution to be
perjured).
7. 113 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1940).
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used in the Taylor case, in that they talk in terms of the error of the trial courts
in admitting illegally-obtained evidence, rather than in terms of loss of jurisdiction.8 They seem to recognize that the court may have jurisdiction even though
there has been an illegal search and seizure. It has been held that in an action
to condemn unlawfully possessed liquor the jurisdiction of the court is unaffected by the legality of the seizure, unless the statute so conditions it. In all
the search and seizure cases the defendant's constitutional rights are protected,
in the federal courts at least, by preventing introduction of the evidence. 10
It seems that it was unnecessary for the court in the instant case to talk in
terms of jurisdiction, for the real issue was whether there had been a competent
and intelligent waiver by the defendant of his rights. Even the case of Johnson v. Zerbst," which held that noncompliance with the 6th Amendment was
a jurisdictional bar to the court's right to proceed, nevertheless recognized
waiver of a constitutional right. A plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional
defects' 2 and all other defenses except the failure of an indictment to charge
an offense under the laws of the United States.' 3 It amounts to a conviction
when the plea has been entered competently and intelligently.14 In the present
case the government's contention that the defendant waived the violation of
his constitutional right by pleading guilty finds substantial support among the
authorities and should have been the ratio decidendi of the decision.
The instant case may be an indication that the trend in the federal courts
is toward adopting the rule that a violation of a constitutional right does not
constitute mere reversible error but affects the court's jurisdiction to try the
case. Perhaps the courts will hold that only a serious violation of basic constitutional rights will affect jurisdiction.
8. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347, 63 Sup. Ct. 608, 87 L.
Ed. 819 (1943) ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed.
652, L.R.A. 1915B 834 (1914) ; Moore v. Aderhold, 108 F.2d 729, 732 (10th Cir. 1939) ;
Peters v. United States, 97 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 1938) ; Grant, ConstitutionalBasis of
the Rule Forbiddingthe Use of Illegally Seized Evidence, 15 So. CALIF. L. R.v. 60 (1941) ;
Wingren, A Short Review of the Law on Searches and Seizures and the Motion to
Suppress the Evidence, 18 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 345 (1946) ; Note, 58 YALE L.J. 144 (1948).
9. Strong v. United States, 46 F.2d 257, 79 A.L.R. 150 (1st Cir. 1931), cert. granted,
283 U.S. 815, 51 Sup. Ct. 492, 75 L. Ed. 1432 (1931), dismissed per stipulation, 284 U.S.
691, 52 Sup. Ct. 27, 76 L. Ed. 583 (1931).
10. The federal exclusionary rule does not depend upon the 4th Amendment for legal
efficacy nor is it a mandate of the 4th Amendment. It is a mere rule of evidence which the
federal courts use to protect the rights of an accused. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 28, 69 Sup. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949) (by implication).
11. 304 U.S. 458, 58 Sup. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938).
12. Weir v. United States, 92 F.2d 634, 114 A.L.R. 481 (7th Cir. 1937), cert. denied,
302 U.S. 761, 58 Sup. Ct. 368, 82 L. Ed. 590 (1937), rehearing denied, 302 U.S. 781, 58
Sup. Ct. 479, 82 L. Ed. 603 (1938).
13. Kachnic v. United States, 53 F.2d 312, 79 A.L.R. 1366 (9th Cir. 1931).
14. Norris v. Hudspeth, 114 F.2d 1007 (10th Cir. 1940); Bugg v. Hudspeth, 113
F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1940).
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JOINT WILLS-COMMON FUND DOCTRINE-APPLICATION WHERE
PROBATE AND VESTITURE OF TITLES ARE POSTPONED
A husband and wife were co-testators of a joint will,' which directed the
executor to support the survivor until the survivor's death and then to distribute the property of the two testators equally among the children. Advancements to the children set out in the will were to be deducted from the
legacies. Moneys above the needs for support of the survivor were to be
prorated among the children by the executor. The will was earlier probated
in common form at the death of the wife; when offered for probate as the
will of the husband, it was contested by a son. The action of the circuit court
in upholding the will was affirmed by the court of appeals. Held, reversed.
The will is invalid as the will of either testator because it sought to dispose
of their separate estates as a common fund and cannot be probated as the
individual will of either testator at his or her death. Richmond v. Richmond,
227 S.W.2d 4 (Tenn. 1950).
The validity of joint wills in general is not questioned in the United
States today. 2 The one exception has been the joint will in which the testators
treat their separate estates as a common fund so that the will is held incapable
of being probated as the will of either testator.3 This exception has been
predicted upon numerous factual difficulties-e.g., questions of lapse, proportionment, ademption, abatement, ascertainment of the time when classes
in class gifts are formed, determination of how the estate of the first decedent
will be administered until the survivor dies, and how the individual debts will
be treated. 4 These difficulties in any case may be such as to cause the court to
1. "Joint will" refers to a plurality of wills in one instrument. A joint will
which has reciprocal provisions for the survivor is called a joint and mutual will. The
interchangeability of the terms joint, mutual, reciprocal, and conjoint has undoubtedly
helped to create a certain amount of confusion about this type of will. See 57 Am. JUM.,
Wills § 681 (1948) ; 1 PAGE, WILLS § 102 (Perm. ed. 1941) ; Eagleton, Joint and Miltual
Wills, 15 CoRNELL L.Q. 358 (1930); Note, 61 HARv. L. REv. 675 (1948). See 169 A.L.R.
95 (1947) for samples of the different forms of these wills.
The will in the reported case was called a joint will rather than a joint and mutual
will probably because the provision for the support of the survivor was not expressed in
words denoting a devise of a particular estate to the survivor. The validity problem in
either case, however, would be the same.
2. See, e.g., Lewis v. Scofield, 26 Conn. 452 (1857); Bright v. Cox, 147 Ga. 474,
94 S.E. 572 (1917); Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E. 216, 27 L.R.A. (N.s.)
508 (1909) ; Popejoy v. Peters, 173 Tenn. 484, 121 S.W.2d 538 (1938) ; Note, 169 A.L.R.
9 (1947).

3. Hershy v. Clark, 35 Ark. 17 (1879); State Bank v. Bliss, 67 Conn. 317, 35 Ati.
255 (1896) ; Walker v. Walker, 14 Ohio St. 157 (1862) ; Epperson v. White, 156 Tenn.
155, 299 S.W. 812, 57 A.L.R. 601 (1927). The exception has been recognized and approved in almost every case involving a joint will.
4. State Bank v. Bliss, 67 Conn. 317, 35 Atl. 255 (1896) (proportionment and debts
problem); Brown v. Brown, 101 Kan. 335, 166 Pac. 499 (1917) (lapse problem) ; Walker
v. Walker, 14 Ohio St. 157 (1862) (questions of administration) ; see 1 PAGE, WILLS
§ 105 (Perm. ed. 1941). But for cases where the court resolved these difficulties see
Graham v. Graham, 297 Mo. 290, 249 S.W. 37 (1923) (debts); Chadwick v. Bristow,
204 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (lapse); Harris v. Harris' Estate, 276 S.W. 964
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (joint will probated without regard to the factual difficulties
that might arise later).
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declare that the "scheme is one which it is impossible to carry out." Some
courts have refused probate on the ground that such wills violate the legal
prnciple that probate and the consequent vestiture of titles must not be
postponed.6
By means of the paramount or dominant intention theory 7 the courts
may avoid the exception and give effect to the will. To the extent that the
holding of the instant case is based upon a finding that the primary intention
of the co-testators was to postpone probate by creating a common fund, it
is in accord with the majority view that a will must be capable of being probated at the death of the testator. However, when the court can find an intention paramount to that of postponing probate or of treating the estates as
a common fund, it should disregard the subsidiary intention altogther.8 It
may then admit the will to probate by invoking existing legal doctrines. Thus,
one court has held that while title passed at the death of the first testator,
the use and enjoyment was postponed until the death of the survivor. 9 Other
theories which the courts may use to effectuate the testators' intention are
the implied life estate,' 0 the implied trust with the executor named as trustee, 1'
and an estate to commence injutturo."2
5. State'Bank v. Bliss, 67 Conn. 317, 35 Atl. 255, 257 (1896). Here, the joint will,
creating a common fund out of which the debts, funeral expenses and legacies were to be
paid, provided against probate until both makers were dead, after making each the
residuary legatee of the other.
6. State Bank v. Bliss, 67 Conn. 317, 35 Atl. 255 (1896) (the will violates statute
that requires probate as soon as may be) ; Epperson v. White, 156 Tenn. 155, 299 S.W.
812, 57 A.L.R. 601 (1927) (to probate the will at the death of the first decedent could
create only an estate to commence in futuro by which the heir should take immediate
possession and deprive the survivor of the intended support). Contra: Cole v. Shelton,
169 Ark. 695, 276 S.W. 993, 43 A.L.R. 1008 (1925) ; Betts v. Harper, 39 Ohio St. 639
(1884) (will not probated until death of both testators); Collins v. Stroup, 71 N.D.
679, 3 N.W.2d 742 (1942) ; see Schumaker v. Schmidt, 44 Ala. 454, 467 (dictum to effect
that will might be probated after death of both testators if the will so intended).
7. Collins v. Stroup, 71 N.D. 679, 3 N.W.2d 742 (1942) ; cf. Davis v. Mitchell, 27
Tenn. App. 182, 178 S.W.2d 889 (W.S. 1943) (paramount intention found in a single
will); 1 PAGE, WILLS § 105 (Perm. ed. 1941).
8. Collins v. Stroup, 71 N.D. 679, 3 N.W2d 742 (1942). This point is well established
in single wills cases. E.g., Poor v. Hodge, 311 Mass. 312, 41 N.E.2d 21 (1942); In re
Knickenberg's Will, 180 Misc. 217, 40 N.Y.S.2d 437 (Surr. Ct. 1943); Vogt v. Meyer,
169 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
9. In so holding, the court said that the clause in the will, "the provisions of this,
our will, are to take effect after our death," constituted no express direction to postpone
probate, and thus distinguished State Bank v. Bliss, supra note 5. Cf. Gerbrich v. Freitag,
213 Ill. 552, 73 N.E. 338 (1905) (survivor took beneficial use until his death). Conra:
Hershy v. Clark, 35 Ark. 17 (1879) (postponement of use and enjoyment renders joint
will invalid).
10. Price v. Aylor, 258 Ky. 1, 79 S.W.2d 350 (1935); Itre Raupp's Will, 10 Misc.
300, 31 N.Y. Supp. 680 (Surr. Ct. 1894) ; see Collins v. Stroup, 71 N.D. 679, 3 N.W.2d
742 (1942).
11. Arnold v. Arnold, 136 N.J. Eq. 169, 40 A.2d 784 (1945); Scarborough v.
Scarborough, 134 N.J. Eq. 201, 34 A.2d 791 (1943) (implied trust raised when executor
given duties beyond ordinary functions of an executor) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 92 Tenn.
559, 23 S.W. 114 (1893).
12. Graham v.Graham, 297 Mo. 290, 249 S.W. 37 (1923) ; Epperson v. White, 156
Tenn. 155, 299 S.W. 812, 57 A.L.R. 601 (1927).
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Another possibility would be to consider the joint will as an enforcible
contract,13 for by so doing, the court could avoid the legal technicalities peculiar to wills. 14 That a joint will may be a contract is recognized, if the
instrument satisfies the requirements of consideration,' 5 clarity and definiteness.16 However, the very factual problems which cause many courts to hold
such joint wills invalid might also prompt them to hold that the agreements
do not meet the technical requirements of a valid contract.
The courts should hesitate to strike down joint wills on generalizations
like the common fund doctrine unless the fact-s of the individual case require
it. The factual and legal difficulites involved in joint wills should receive
7
the same treatment as those of single wills; and the same policy factors,'
presumptions,' and rules of construction 9 which are invoked by the courts
when considering other types of wills should be applied to joint wills.
In the instant case the dominant intention as expressed in the will was
to bequeath the testators' estates to their children equally after the survivor
13. In re Johnson's Estate, 233 Iowa 782, 10 N.W.2d 664, 148 A.L.R. 748 (1943)
(joint and mutual will established a prior agreement) ; Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 151 App.
Div. 853, 136 N.Y. Supp. 961 (1st Dep't 1912) ; Seat v. Seat, 172 Tenn. 618, 113 S.W2d
751 (1938); Harrell v. Hickman, 147 Tex. 396, 215 S.W.2d 876 (1948) (joint and
mutual will testamentary and contractual). Contra: Clements v. Jones, 166 Ga. 738,
144 S.E. 319 (1928) ; Menke v. Duwe, 117 Kan. 207, 230 Pac. 1065 (1924). See Note,
Joint and Mutual Wills-Contracts to Devise, 19 MrNN. L. REv. 95 (1934).
14. Cf. Puckett v. Hatcher, 307 Ky. 160, 209 S.W.2d 742 (1948) ; Ireland v. Jacobs,

114 Colo. 168, 163 P.2d 203, 161 A.L.R. 1413 (1945), in which a joint w.ill, improperly

attested, was not unheld as a contract since the consideration required was the execution
of a valid joint will. But see Sears, Joint and Mutual Wills, 18 RocKr MT. L. Rnv. 366
(1946), which strongly criticized Ireland v. Jacobs on the ground that the promise to
make a valid joint will was the consideration. An analogy might be drawn to joint wills
that have been revoked by the survivor and not allowed to be probated but the contract
nevertheless upheld.

15. Ireland v. Jacobs, 115 Colo. 168, 163 P.2d 203, 161 A.L.R. 1413 (1945) (failure of
one will is failure of consideration) ; Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill. 538, 191 N.E. 307 (1934)
(mutual promises of husband and wife in joint will is sufficient consideration); Baker
v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N.W. 998 (1910) ; Wright v. Wright, 215 Ky. 394, 285 S.W.

188 (1926); Nye v. Bradford, 144 Tex.- 618, 193 S.W.2d 165, 169 A.L.R. 1 (1946)
(unequal consideration).

16. Frese v. Meyer, 392 111. 59, 63 N.E.2d 768 (1945) (convincing) ; Frazier v.
,
• 0, 9
,
..
(..)
(
) (clear, convincing and

satisfactory)
; Beveridge v Bailey, 53 S.D. 98, 220 N.W. 462, 60 A.L.R. 619 (1928)
(clear).

17. Public policy favors joint will provisions which provide for support of *the
survivor where co-testators are closely related. Bright v. Cox, 147 Ga. 474, 94 S:E. 572
1917) (devise to nephew with limitations to support survivor of husband-wife joint will) ;
Lewis v. Lewis, 104 Kan. 269, 178 Pac. 421 (1919) (joint and mutual will of husband
and wife giving life estate to survivor). And, as a practical matter, joint co-testators
are nearly always closely related. See Note, Joint and Mutual Wills-Contracts to
Devise, 19 MiNN. I. REv. 95 (1934).
18. Presumption against intestacy. E.g., Zabel v. Stewart, 153 Kan. 272, 1109 P.2d
177 (1941) (joint will); Nichols v. Todd, 20 Tenn. App. 564, 101 S.W.2d 486 (M.S.
1936) (single will); Hunt v. Carroll, 157 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), error dismissed, 140 Tex. 424, 168 S.W.2d 238 (1943) (single will).
19. Testator's intent controls unless contrary to a positive rule of law. E.g., Snith
v. Bell, 6 Pet. 68, 8 L. Ed. 322 (U.S. 1832) ; Price v. Aylor, 258 Ky. 1, 79 S.W.2d 350
(1935); Keeling v. Keeling, 185 Tenn. 134, 203 S.W.2d 601 (1947)..
Further courts construe wills so as to sustain rather than nullify them. Keeling v.
Keeling, 185 Tenn. 134, 203 S.W.2d 601 (1947) ; Sales v. Southern Trust Co., 182 Tenn.
270, 185 S.W.2d 623 (1945).
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had received support from both estates until his or her death. The desire to
postpone probate or to create a common fund was at best a subsidiary intention.
To carry out the dominant intention, the court could have raised an implied
trust which would have passed title to the executor at the death of either
testator, with the survivor as life beneficiary and the children as remaindermen.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-GOVERNMENTAL TORT IMMUNITYLIABILITY OF CITY FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM DEFECTIVE
TRAFFIC SIGNAL
An automatic traffic signal, one of four located at an intersection in defendant city, was knocked down and made inoperative. After learning of its
defective condition, city officials failed to repair this signal but allowed the
other three to remain in operation. Relying upon a green signal, plaintiff and
her husband entered the intersection and collided with an automobile whose
driver had eritered the intersection on the uncontrolled right-of-way. In an
action for the wrongful death of the husband, the city defended on the ground
that it was immune from tort liability because traffic control is a governmental
function. Held, judgment for plaintiff affirmed. While traffic controls may be
a governmental function, the maintenance of the physical means of control is
("a corporate duty for the failure of which liability [is] incurred." Johltson
v. City of East Moline, 405 Ill. 450, 91 N.E.2d 401 (1950).'
Although the maintenance of streets and highways is generally considered
a corporate or proprietary function, for the negligent performance of which
a municipality may be liable, 2 most courts hold that the control of traffic is
a governmental function with no consequent liability for tortious injuries.8
Thus, cities have been held immune from tort liability where an injury to a
plaintiff resulted from the defective operation of a traffic signal, 4 from failure
to maintain a stop sign,5 and from failure to enforce ordinances passed for the
control of traffic. 6
1. For a discussion of the effect of this decision on the municipal corporation doctrine
of tort liability in Illinois, see Note, 45 ILL. L. REv. 124 (1950).
2. Bickel Asphalt Paving Co. v. Yeager, 176 Ky. 712, 197 S.W. 417 (1917); Fitzgerald v. Village of Bovey, 174 Minn. 450, 219 N.W. 774 (1928); Pardini v. Reno,
50 Nev. 392, 263 Pac. 768 (1928) ; 5 BLASnFIELD, CY"CLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 3191 (1935); 7 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 2900-03 (2d ed.,

Moore, 1945) ; Repko, Legal Commentary on Municipal Tort Liability, 9 LAW & CoNrai1P.
PRoB. 214 (1942).
3. See notes 4, 5, and 6 infra. Murray, Recent Trends in Municipal Tort Liability,
5 LEGAL NOTES ox LOCAL Gov'T 353-54 (1940); Note, 161 A.L.R. 1404 (1946).

4. Dorminey v. City of Montgomery, 232 Ala. 47, 166 So. 689 (1936); Avey v,
West Palm Beach, 152 Fla. 717, 12 So.2d 881 (1943). Cf. Hodges v. Charlotte, 214 N.C.
737, 200 S.E. 889 (1939).
5. Kirk v. Muskogee, 183 Okla. 544, 83 P.2d 594 (1938).

6. Doughty v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 321 Pa. 136, 184 Atl. 93 (1936) ; Powell
v. Nashville, 167 Tenn. 334, 69 S.W.2d 894, 92 A.L.R. 1493 (1934) ; Hagerman v. Seattle,
189 Wash. 694, 66 P.2d 1152, 110 A.L.R. 1110 (1937), Note 92 A.L.R. 1495 (1934).
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Attempts to bring the operation of traffic control devices within the sphere
of the corporate function of street and highway maintenance, in both those
jurisdictions where the common law doctrine is applicable 7 and in those where
statutes have specifically made cities liable for unsafe streets, s have been generally unsuccessful. The reason usually given for excluding traffic controls
from this general rule applicable to unsafe streets is that the negligent operation of a traffic control device does not constitute a physical defect in the
street which the city is duty-bound to eliminate.9 Further, the courts generally
reject the argument that a defective signal-constitutes a nuisance.' 0
There is an apparent inconsistency in holding a city liable for unsafe streets
while extending immunity where a defective traffic control device causes injury.
This seems to point up the fallacy in the doctrine as applied to negligence in
maintaining streets, 11 for probably no greater public benefit is derived from
any municipal enterprise than from the use of streets and highways. Yet in
sanctioning liability for street injuries, the courts take the view that the maintenance and repair of streets is merely ministerial and not within the realm
of those general duties of the city considered governmental in nature.' 2 But
the courts apparently have not been impressed by the argument that the
maintnance of a traffic signal, stop sign, or warning sign involves a municipal
function similar to that required in repairing streets.
The court in the instant case did not attempt to draw an analogy between
a physical defect in a street and a physical defect in the control signal.' 3 But
it based its holding on the ground that when a city voluntarily assumes a
function not required by statute, even though "governmental" in nature, it is
charged with a duty not to cause injury as a result of that function. 14 The
inequities of governmental immunity from tort liability, as well as the difficulties in determining the nature of the function of a municipality, have been
7. Dorminey v. City of Montgomery, 232 Ala. 47, 166 So. 689 (1936) ; Auslander

v. St. Louis, 332 Mo. 145, 56 S.W.2d 778 (1932).
8. Tolliver ,v. Newark, 145 Ohio St. 517, 62 N.E.2d 357, 161 A.L.R. 1391 (1945).
9. Dorminey v. City of Montgomery, 232 Ala. 47, 166 So. 689, 691' (1936) ; Auslander
v. St. Louis, 332 Mo. 145, 56 S.W.2d 778 (1932). In the latter case the court discussed this
distinction in detail.
10. Kirk v. Muskogee, 183 Okla. 544, 83 P.2d 594 (1938) ; Notes, 161 A.L.R. 1404,
1410 (1946); 92 A.L.R. 1495 (1934). Cf. James v. City of Waterbury, 126 Conn. 525,
12 A.2d 770 (1940). It should be noted that liability for creating a nuisance is generally
considered an exception to the municipal corporation doctrine of tort liability, and a city
must respond in damages regardless of whether or not the nuisance results from a governmental or proprietary function. City of Hamilton v. Dilley, 120 Ohio St. 127, 165 N.E.
713 (1929) ; Knoxville v. Lively, 141 Tenn. 22, 206 S.W. 180 (1918) ; Note, 75 A.L.R.
1196 (1931).
11. "The rule that subjects a municipality to liability for the failure to maintain its
streets . . .is nevertheless exceptional and anomolous." Hanson .v. Berry, 54 N.D. 487,
209 N.W. 1002 (1926);
12. "The conclusion deserves approval, though not necessarily the ground on which
it is based." Borchard, Governme,;tal Liability In Tort, 34 YALE LJ.229 (1925).
13. Such analogy, was apparently the basis of the holding in the lower appellate
court. For example, see the language in Johnson v. City of East Moline; 338 Ill. App. 220,
87 N.E.2d 22, 27 (1949).
14. 91 N.E.2d at 405. But cf.'Phinney-v. Seattle, 208 P.2d 879 (Wash. 1949).
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the subject of frequent attacks for many years ;'r and the instant case, opposed
by the great weight of authority, perhaps reflects a judicial response to the
many critics of the doctrine.

NEGLIGENCE-DEGREE OF CARE OWED BY BUSINESS VISITOR
TO THIRD PARTIES' ON LAND OF ANOTHER-DOES BUSINESS
VISITOR ASSUME POSITION OF LANDOWNER?
The driver of a gasoline trucjc for defendant oil company spilled a small
amount of gasoline near the tanks of a filling station while making a routine
delivery of gasoline. Soon thereafter, the plaintiff, a seven-year-oklboy, came
on the premises and while playing there was injured while attempting to
extinguish a fire set in the gasoline by a playmate. The defendant claimed
that he, as a business visitor, was entitled to the same immunities as the landowner, as against the plaintiff who was a trespasser or gratuitous licensee.
From a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant appeals. Held (5-2), a
business visitor is liable for negligent acts which are outside the business
function for which he is on the premises.' Mitdrich v. Standard Oil Co., 153
Ohio St. 31, 90 N.E.2d 859 (1950).
In suits to recover for negligent acts occurring on his premises, the courts
generally hold a landowner to a lower standard of care than that owed by other
persons.P The duty of a landowner to use care varies with the status of the
plaintiff, who may be a trespasser, a licensee, or a business visitor or invitee..
This restricted liability of the landowner has been extended to the
possessors of the land,4 to servants, 5 and to members of the household,0 but
the majority of the courts do not extend the immunity to trespassers, licensees,
or holders of easements. 7 The decisions in regard to extending this limited
15. E.g., see Borchard, Governmental Liability int Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924);
Green, Freedom of Litigation, 38 ILL. L. REV. 117 (1943); Seasongood, Municipal'
Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or ProprietaryTest, 22 VA. L. REV. 910
(1936) "
1. No decision was made as to the actual status of the plaintiff, nor as to whether
or not a business visitor was entitled to the same immunities as the landowner. 90 N.E.2d
at 862.
2. PROssER, ToaRs § 77 (1941). For a collection of cases dealing specifically with the
duty owed by the owner of a public gasoline station see Note, 116 A.L.R. 1205 (1938) ;
for a discussion of negligence in respect to delivery of petroleum products see Note, 151
A.L.R. 1261 (1944).
3. PaossER, ToRTs §§ 77-79 (1941).

4. 65 C.J.S., Negligence §§ 24(n), 35(i), 45(a) (1950).
5. Magar v. Hammond, 183 N.Y. 387, 76 N.E. 474, 3 L.R.A.

(right extended to a caretaker and gamekeeper) ; RxsTArsMamM,

1038 (1906)
§ 382 (1934).

(N.s.)

ToRTs

6. Sohn v. Katz, 112 N.J.L. 106, 169 Atl. 838, 90 A.L.R. 880 (1934).
7. Constantino v. Watson Contracting Co., 219 N.Y. 443, 114 N.E. 802 (1916)

(mason killed by negligence of contractor) ; Cavanaugh v. People's Gas & Electric Co.,
234 App. Div. 402, 254 N.Y. Supp. 835 (4th Dep't 1932) (boy in contact with electric
wires while on bridge owned by neither party) ; Irwin Savings & Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 349 Pa. 278, 37 A.2d 432, 434 (1944) ; Fitzpatrick v. Penfield, 267 Pa. 564,
109 AtI. 653 (1920) ; Cox v. U.S. Coal & Coke Co., 80 W, Va. 295, 92 S.E. 559, L.R.A.
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immunity to business visitors are not so clear. Some courts hold that the
liability of the business visitor is no greater than that owed by the landowner.8
To escape the consequences of this conclusion, other courts have sometimes
resorted to various devices to make the business visitor liable for his negligence.
In some cases a business visitor has been arbitrarily classed as a licensee;9
in other liability has been based upon the negligence of the business visitor
in making the premises unsafe, instead of upon his failure to use care in
making them safe.' 0 The instant case offers another basis for attaching
liability to the business visitor. The court held that the defendant was a business visitor for the purpose of putting gasoline in the tanks, but that in spilling
it, defendant went beyond the scope of this purpose and therefore was not
entitled to the status of a business visitor."
The restricted liability of a landowner to trespasser frequently has been
said to be based upon the fact that the trespass cannot be foreseen and guarded
against. 12 If this is the true basis, then there is no reason why the immunity
1918B 1118 (1917) ; accord, Cassidy v. Welsh, 319 Mass. 615, 67 N.E.2d 226, 229 (1946) ;
Reichvalder v. Borough of Taylor, 322 Pa. 72, 185 Atl. 270 (1936) ; Excelsior Wire Rope

Co. v. Callan, (1930) A.C. 404; Mourton v. Poulter, (1930) 2 K.B. 183. Contra: State

Compensation Insurance Fund v. AlIen, 104 Cal. App. 400, 285 Pac. 1053 (1930);
Lindholm v. Northwestern P.R.R., 79 Cal. App. 34, 248 Pac. 1033 (1926); Downes v.
Elmira Bridge Co., 179 N.Y. 136, 71 N,E. 743 (1904); McCann v. Thilemann, 36
Misc. 145, 72 N.Y. Supp. 1076 (Sup. Ct. 1901) ; Waller v. Smith, 116 Wash. 645, 200
Pac. 95 (1921). The state of Massachusetts has extended the landowner's immunity more
consistently than any other state: Falardeau v. Malden & Melrose Gas Light Co., 275 Mass.
196, 175 N.E. 471 (1931) ; Murphy v. Boston & M.R.R., 248 Mass. 78, 142 N.E. 782
(1924) ; Hafey v. Dwight Mfg. Co., 240 Mass. 155, 133 N.E. 107 (1921) ; McIntyre v.
Converse, 238 Mass. 592, 131 N.E. 198 (1921) ; Robbins v. Minute Tapioca Co., 236 Mass.
387, 128 N.E. 417 (1920); McManus v. Thing, 194 Mass. 362, 80 N.E. 487 (1907);
Blackstone v. Chelmsford Foundry Co., 170 Mass. 321, 49 N.E. 635 (1898). See PRossER,
TORTS 612, 626 (1941); Note, 90 A.L.R. 886 (1934); 20 B.U.L. Rxv. 748 (1940), 21
MnrN. L. Rxv. 338 (1937) ; 12 Tmx. L. REv. 98 (1933). For collection of cases involving

electric power companies on the land of another see Notes, 100 A.L.R. 621 (1936), 56
A.L.R. 1021 (1928), 14 A.L.R. 1023 (1921), 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 506 (1929), 12 MINNq.
L. Rav. 420 (1928),

18 Tax. L. REv. 100 (1939).

8. Kirkpatrick v. Damianakes, 15 Cal. App. 2d 446, 59 P.2d 556 (1936) ; Louisville
Trust Co. v. Horn, 209 Ky. 827, 273 S.W. 549 (1925) ; Murphy v. Boston & M.R.R., 248
Mass. 78, 142 N.E. 782 (1924) ; Whitney v. Terry & Tench Co., 158 App. Div. 608, 143
N.Y. Supp. 905 (1st Dep't 1913) ; Ireland v. Complete Machinery & Equipment Co., 174
Misc. 91, 21 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
9. Terre Haute, I. &E. Traction Co. v. Sanders, 80 Ind. App. 16, 136 N.E. 54 (1922);
Toomey v. Wichison Industrial Gas Co., 144 Kan. 534, 61 P.2d 891, 894 (1936) ; Duel v.
Mansfield Plumbing Co., 86 N.J.L. 582. 92 Atl. 367 (1914). See Toy v. Atlantic Gulf &
Pacific Co., 176 Md. 197, 4 A.2d 757 (1939).

10. Dennehy v. Jordan Marsh Co., 321 Mass. 78, 71 N.E.2d 758 (1947) (plaintiff,
four year old boy, was injured while playing in a packing case left on the premises by
defendant mercantile company while delivering a refrigerator to another family occupying
the same premises). See Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Thompson, 196 Ark. 1012, 120
S.W.2d 709 (1938) (plaintiff was tenant on land that defendant entered under authority

of the landlord).
11. 90 N.E.2d at 862. The method used by this court in fixing liability upon the
defendant is closely analogous to the liability of the master for the acts of a servant done
within the scope of employment, FERsox, BASIS OF CoNxRAcTs 229-30 (1949). But cf.
Lindley v. McKay, 201 Ark. 675, 146 S.W.2d 545 (1941); Herr v. Simplex Paper Box

Corp.. 330,Pa. 129, 198 Atl. 309 (1938); Shuck v. Carney, 22 Tenn. App. 125, 118 S.W.2d
896 (W.S. 1937).
12. PROSSER, TORTS 610 (1941)-
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should not be extended to third parties, since they have no more ability to
foresee the presence of outsiders than the landowner. A better explanation for
the landowner's immunity is that it is based upon the Anglo-Saxon feudal
concept of ownership, and it is still regarded as a socially desirable policy to
protect the landowner in the use and enjoyment of his property.1 3 If this latter
explanation is the true one, there is no adequate reason to extend the immunity
to others unless they stand in the shoes of the landowner as, for example,
possessors, servants and members of the household. The extension of the
immunity to either trespassers or licensees would not, in any way, serve
to protect the owner's interest. There may be reason for extending the immunity to business visitors, for it can be argued that failure to do so would
discourage business visitors from entering the premises and, by denying the
owner the benefit of their presence, would deprive him of the fullest enjoyment of his ownership of the land. 14 The business visitor, however, also has
an interest in coming upon the land, and it is doubtful that such an extension
of restricted liability would in fact secure to the landowner any benefit or
enjoyment that he would not otherwise have. On this basis there is no reason
to distinguish the business visitor from trespassers and licensees in refusing
to extend the landowner's immunity.

PLEADING-JOINDER OF PARTIES-JOINDER OF TORTFEASORS WHERE
LIABILITY NOT JOINT
The plaintiff slipped and fell on an ice-covered public sidewalk. The city
and the abutting landowner were joined as defendants under counts alleging:
(1) the negligence of the city in creating the slippery condition while cleaning
the street; (2) the negligence of the defendant landowner in violating an
ordinance requiring him to keep sidewalks clear and the negligence of defendant city in failing to enforce the ordinance; and (3) the negligence of
defendant landowner in creating the slippery condition of the sidewalk.
Special demurrers by both defendants were sustained and the suit dismissed.
Held, affirmed. The declaration did not state a cause of action against either
defendant. The court emphasized as an alternative holding that a city and an
abutting landowner may not be sued together for injuries resulting from a
defective or dangerous sidewalk. Hale v. City of Kzo.xville, 189 Tenn. 491,
226 S.W.2d 265 (1949).
At common law, all persons who acted in concert to commit a tort,
in pursuance of a common design, were held liable for the entire damages
13. Goodrich, Landowner's Duty to Strangers on his Premises, 7 IOWA L. BULL. 65,
71 (1922).
14. See 21 MIN,. L. R~v. 338 (1937).
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on the theory that they had engaged in a joint enterprise.' The rule was
subject to rigid restrictions and was limited to "cases of concerted action
where a mutual agency might be found."2 Unless there was a concert of
action in violation of a common duty on the part of the parties defendant,
there was no joint tort, even though their acts worked together to produce
the injury;3 and each tortfeasor was held liable only for the.harm resulting
from his separate wrong. 4 Under substantive law, joint tortfeasors incurred
a joint responsibility for the injury and each was liable for the entire amount;
thus the identity of the cause of action against each defendant was clear.
The plaintiff, as a matter of procedure, was permitted to sue them together
in a single action at law.8
If the defendants were not under a common duty to the plaintiff, then
there was no identity of the causes of action, they were not joint tortfeasors,
and joinder was not allowed.0 Under this rule it is generally held that .a
municipal corporation and an abutting landowner may not be sued jointly
for injuries caused by a defective or unsafe sidewalk since the substantive
duty of each is regarded as separate. 7 However, in Osborn v. City of Nashville,8 the Tennessee court reached a result directly contrary to the general
rule in allowing the city and an abutting landowner to be joined in an action
for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when she fell on a sidewalk made slippery
1. Sir John Heydon's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 5, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (K.B. 1612).
2. Psossm, TORTS 1096 (1941).

3. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Cities Service Co., 273 Fed. 946 (D. Del. 1921) ; Sparkman
v. Swift, 81 Ala. 231, 8 So. 160 (1886); Le Laurin v. Murray, 75 Ark. 232, 87 S.W.
131 (1905) ; Livesay v. First National Bank, 36 Colo. 526, 86 Pac. 102, 118 Am.St. Rep.

120, 6 L.R.A. (z;.s.) 598 (1906); Swain v. Tennessee Copper Co., 111 Tenn. 430, 78
S.W. 93 (1903). Contra: McDaniel v. City of Cherryvale, 91 Kan. 40, 136 Pac. 899,
50 L.R.A. (w.s.) 388 (1913).
4. The Tennessee definition of joint tortfeasors: "When a tort is committed by two
or more persons jointly, by force directly applied, or in the pursuit of a common purpose
or design, or by concert, or in the advancement of a common interest, or as the result
and effect of joint concurrent negligence, there is no doubt but that all tortfeasors are
jointly and severally liable for all the damages done the injured party. . . ." Swain
v. Tennessee Copper Co., 111 Tenn. 430, 438, 78 S.W. 93, 94 (1903). This definition,
as quoted with approval in the instant case, strictly applies the common law requirements.
5. The subject of joinder of tortfeasors at law is su*rrounded by no' little uncertainty
and confusion. Much of this is occasioned by failure to differentiate between the nature
of the plaintiff's substantive right and the procedure by which it may be enforced. It is
one thing to define the nature or character of the plaintiff's substantive right and the
defendants correlative duty as joint or several, or joint and several, and quite a different
thing to consider the procedural tools for calling into play such substantive rights and
duties. The early common law judges refused to allow more than one cause of action
to be sued on in a single writ. Thus unless the plaintiff had a substantive right jointly
against the defendants, he was required to purchase a separate writ against each. The
advantage to the King's Exchequer was obvious.
6. Mineral City v. Gilbow, 81 Ohio St. 263, 90 N.E. 800, 801, 25 L.R.A. (N.s.)
627 (1909).
7. Schneider V.. City 'Council of Augusta, 118 Ga. 610, 45 S.E. 459, 460 (1903);
Dutton v. Burough-of Lansdowne, 198 Pa. 563, 48 At. 494, 83 Am. St. Rep. 814, 53
L.R.A. 469 (1901) ; Weist v.Philadelphia, 200 Pa. 148, 49 At. 891, 58 L.R.A. 666 (1901).
8. 182 Tenn. 197, 185 S.W.2d 510 (1945). For a similar holding, see Fortmeyer v.
National Biscuit Co., 116 Minn. 158, 133 N.W. 461, 37 L.R.A. (N.s.) 569 -(1911).
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by negligent painting by the defendant landowner.9 The court in the instant
case, ignoring the Osborn decision, followed the general common law view
in holding that where the liabilities or duties of the defendants are not identical,
it is not permissible to join them in a single action at law; and so the city
and the property owner responsible for the condition of the sidewalk may not
be sued together.
There would appear to be sound policy reasons for allowing a joinder
of parties who are not joint tortfeasors where the acts of each have combined
to produce a single, indivisible injury.10 The argument is raised by some
courts that, if joinder is allowed, the common law prohibition against contribution between joint tortfeasors would cut off any right of recovery which
one defendant might otherwise have against other defendants. This argument
is without force. Mere joinder as a matter of procedural convenience would
not make the parties joint tortfeasors. If joinder is thus properly viewed
as a procedural tool with its purpose to expedite justice and avoid a multiplicity of actions, there would be no bar to a substantive adjustment of claims
between the joint defendants.'" But in the absence of statutory enactments,
the great weight of authority in common law jurisdictions continues to require a concert of action on the part of the defendants before they may be
2
sued jointly.'
Since the enactment of the Field Code in New York in 1848,13 many
states by statute have modified the common law rules of procedure to allow
the joinder in one action of all parties liable jointly or severally, or jointly
and severally, for the injury complained of by the plaintiff. 14 Under such a
statute, the courts may avoid imposing the hardships of the common law
rule which denied joinder of defendants whose dogs had killed the plaintiff's
sheep, 15 or whose separate dams had contributed to the flooding of the plain9. No authority was cited in the opinion to support the joinder. It is interesting
to note that the city did not raise the issue of misjoinder in the briefs submitted to the
Court of Appeals and to the Supreme Court.

10. "Why should the plaintiff, having but one cause of action and entitled to only

one satisfaction of it, be compelled to proceed against the defendants separately, and

bring three actions, instead of one, for the same cause of action?" Fortmeyer v. National
Biscuit Co., 116 Minn. 158, 133 N.W. 461, 462, 37 L.R.A. (m.s.) 569 (1911).
11. "If the defendants were sued separately, they would be entitled to contribution
among themselves, [and] the right would not be lost by their joinder in the same action."
Fortmeyer v. National Biscuit Co., 116 Minn. 158, 133 N.W. 461, 462, 37 L.R.A. (m.s.)
569 (1911).
12. See note 3 supra.
13. Providing in part: "Any person may be made a defendant who has or claims
an interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff or who is a necessary party to the
complete determination or settlement of the questions involved therein." See Finsr
REPORT OF Nuw YoRE CoMMissIoNERs ON PLEADING & Pa~cTIcE 124 (1848).

14. Williams v. Kozlowsld, 313 Pa. 219, 169 Atl. 148, 94 A.L.R. 536 (1933).
15. Nohre v. Wright, 98 Minn. 477, 108 N.W. 865 (1906).
16. William Tackaberry Co. v. Sioux City Service Co., 154 Iowa 358, 132 N.W.
945, 40 L.R_4.. (m.s.) 102 (1911).
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tiff's land,16 or whose chimneys had emitted fumes which joined in injuring
7
the plaintiff's property.'
The Tennessee Supreme Court is vested by statute with power to adopt
"rules to regulate the procedure, practice, and pleading in the circuit and/or
superior criminal courts, for the purpose of simplifying same and of promoting the speedy determination of litigation upon its merits."' 8 The liberalization of the rules of procedure to allow the joinder of all parties liable
on a single injury would greatly facilitate and economize the administration
of justice in Tennessee.
TAXATION-INTERGOVERNMENTAL

IMMUNITY-MUNICIPAL TAX ON

BANK DEPOSIT IN CONTRACTOR'S -NAME WHERE COUNTERSIGNATURE
OF FEDERAL. OFFICER REQUIRED
The Tim Aircraft Corporation contracted on a cost-plus basis to manu-

facture aircraft for the United States. To facilitate financing, the United
States agreed to make advance payments, subject to their being deposited in
a special bank account of the corporation, the advances to be used for-the
purposes of the contract only. The contracting officer for the Government was
to approve each withdrawal and countersign all checks. If that officer at any
time thought that the amount in the account was in excess of that needed for
current operating expenses, the corporation agreed to return the excess. If
the Uniked States exercised its power to cancel the contract at any time,.the
amount in the account was to be returned to the Federal Government. A
municipal ad valorem tax was collected against the account, and the corporation sought to obtain a refund. Upon trial, in which the United States intervened, judgment was entered for plaintiff and defendants appealed. Held
(5-2), reversed. The tax was not upon the-property- of the United States; the

ownership of the account was in-the.contractor; despite the:limitations placed
upon its use. Timin Aikcraft Corp. v.-B ra-,-213 P.2d 715-(Cal: 1950).
A state cannot tax the Federal Government, its property :pr -instru-

mentalities,' unless Congress permits such taxation.2 Followiig-the decision
17. Key v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 18 Ga. App. 472, 89 S.E. 593 (1916).

18. TENN. CoDE ANN.- -§ 9928 (Williams 1934). But "nothing in this sectioh -shall
be construed to vest in the supreme court power to abrogate, suspend or modify any
statutory rule of practice.

. .

." There is at present no existing statute covering the

joinder problem in the instant case. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 8611 (Williams 1934) authorizes
joinder only of persons bound jointly and 'severally, or jointly or severally, on- the same
instrument, judgment, decree, or statute.
1.United States v. Allegheny County; 322 U.S. 174, 64 Sup. Ct. 908, 88,L. Ed.
1209 (1944), 28 MARQ. L. Rxv. 133, 20 -NomDA-mE LAw. 98, 24 OR. L. R-v. 60, 93 U.
or PA,. L. Rzv. 99; Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. 341, 44 Sup. Ct. 121, 68
L. Ed. 328 (1923) ; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 4 L. Ed. 579 (U.S. 1819) ; cf.
Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 63 Sup. Ct. 1137, 87 L. Ed. 1504, 147 A.L.R. 761
(1943) (inspection fee upon government-owied feitilizer).
2. See Austin v. The Aldermen,'7 Wall. 694, 699, 19 L. Ed, 224,.226 (U.S. 1868);
Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Wall. 573, 583, 585, 18 L. Ed. 229, _'3f (U.S. 1865).
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in McCulloch v. Maryland,a state taxes, even though assessed against a person
or entity other than the United States, were held unconstitutional if the
economic burden eventually fell upon the Federal Government. 4
However, in recent years, decisions have been handed down permitting
a nondiscriminatory state tax upon the income of employees of federal
agencies ;5 a state tax upon the gross receipts of a contractor working on
a federal project;6 an ad valorem tax upon a contractor's claim against the
Federal Government ;7 property taxes upon the interest of purchasers of lands
from the United States under executory installment contracts, the United
States retaining rights of redemption in cases of default ;B an ad valorem tax
upon the possessory interest of a lessee of lands from the United States,
where the lease was to continue until completion (according to a fixed schedule)
by the lessee of construction of ships for the Federal Government;9 gross
product taxes upon oil produced by lessees of land held by the United States
in trust for certain Indian tribes; 10 a state excise tax upon gasoline imported
from other states by a contractor for use on a federal project;"1 a sales tax
upon materials bought by a cost-plus Government contractor, each purchase
requiring approval of the contracting officer, where title passed to the United
States upon delivery to the project;12 and a use tax upon materials bought
out of state by a cost-plus contractor, each purchase requiring approval of
the contracting officer, where title passed to the Federal Government upon
delivery to the project;13 similarly, a state has been permitted to enforce
minimum milk prices on sales to the United States Army. 14
See 51 Am. Ju. Taxation § 222 (1944). Mr. Justice Roberts, dissenting in James v.
Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 181, 58 Sup. Ct. 208, 82 L. Ed. 155, 114 A.L.R. 318,
345 (1937), said: "No one denies the competence of the Congress to waive the immunity
in whole or in part."
3. 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (U.S. 1819).
4. New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401, 57 Sup. Ct. 269, 81 L. Ed. 306
(1937); Jaybird Mining Company v. Weir, 271 -U.S. 609, 46 Sup. Ct. 592, 70 L. Ed.
1112 (1926) ; Dobbins v. Coim'rs of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435, 10 L. Ed. 1022 (U.S. 1842).
5. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 83 L. Ed. 927,
120 A.L.R. 1466 (1939).
6. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 58 Sup. Ct. 208, 82 L. Ed. 155,
114 A.L.R. 318 (1937).
7. Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111, 65 Sup. Ct. 157, 89 L. Ed. 107 (1944).
8. S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 66 Sup. Ct. 749, 90 L. Ed. 851 (1946),
46 Con. L. REv. 660, 20 So. CALIF. L. Rv. 212 (1947) ; Bancroft Inv. Corp. v. City of
Jacksonville, 157 Fla. 546, 27 So.2d 162 (1946) ; accord, New Brunswick v. United States,
276 U.S. 547, 48 Sup. Ct. 371, 72 L. Ed. 693 (1928) ; see Note, 19 RocKY MT. L. RFv.
407 (1947).
9. Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Cal. 2d 610,. 184 P.2d 879 (1947); see Note, 22 IND. L.J.
192 (1947).

10. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 69 Sup. Ct. 561, 93 L. Ed.
721 (1949) ; cf. Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474, 66 Sup. Ct. 663, 90 L. Ed. 793 (1946)
(severance tax upon contractor removing timber from United States land).
11. Trinityfarm Construction Co, v. Grosjean, 291 U.S. 466, 54 Sup. Ct. 469, 78 L. Ed.

918 (1934).

12. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 62 Sup. Ct. 43, 86 L. Ed. 3 (1941).
13. Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14, 62 Sup. Ct. 48, 86 L. Ed. 9 (1941).
14. Penn Dairies, Inc, v. Milk Contfol Comm'n of Pennsylvania, 318 U.S. 261, 63
Sup. Ct. 617, 87 L. Ed. 748 (1943).
.
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The recent cases represented a trend, recognized by the Supreme Court, 15
requiring direct ownership of, or direct participation by, the Federal Government in the thing or transaction taxed as prerequisite to the application of the
doctrine of implied immunity. In the cases of cost-plus contracts, the added cost
to the Government caused by the taxes is beyond dispute. In the abovementioned cases involving sales and use taxes, where the contracting officer
had to approve the purchases and title passed to the United States upon delivery, while the United States did not take legal title at the time of the purchase, the practical effect was that the goods were bought for the Government.
fn the instant case, the burden of the tax unquestionably fell on the Federal
Government. However, the majority inferred from the facts that the transaction between the Government and the corporation was such that title to the
special account was not in the United States. 16 In short, the test for the
application of the doctrine of implied immunity has shifted from one of
whether the burden of the tax falls upon the United States to one of whether
the Government is the party involved in the transaction which is taxed or
has technical legal title to the thing taxed. 17
The instant case is illustrative of this shift in the test. The change is
consistent with a desire to permit state taxation wherever technically possible
to the end that the revenue of the states may be preserved. In spite of the
increasing amount of business done, and property owned, by the Federal
Government, this development has prevented the concentration of the burden
of state taxation on progressively fewer taxpayers. 19
15. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 352, 69 Sup. Ct. 561, 567, 93
L. Ed. 721, 732 (1949) ; United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 177, 64 Sup. Ct.
908, 911, 88 L. Ed. 1209, 1214 (1944); Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n of
Pennsylvania, 318 U.S. 261, 270, 63 Sup. Ct. 617, 621, 87 L. Ed. 748, 754 (1943) ; James
v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 150, 58 Sup. Ct. 208, 216, 82 L. Ed. 155, 167,
114 A.L.R. 318, 328 (1937);.see Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax- Immunities, 58 HAv. L. Rv. 633 (1945); Note, 20 Noa. DA E LAw. 139 (1944).
16. The District Court of Appeal held that the account was owned by the United
States. Timm Aircraft Corp. v. Byram, 202 P.2d 771 (Cal. 1949)..
17. In connection with this test, it should be noted that in the cases of purchasers of
lands from the Federal Government under installment contracts, while legal title to the
lands remains in the United States; the tax is upon the interest of the vendee, subject
to any interest of the United States. See note 8 supra.
18. On instant case see 36 Va. L. Rxv. 553 (1950). For a discussion of implied
immunity see Rice, Problems of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities Arising Out of
Federal Contract Termination and Property Disposal, 54 YALE L.J. 665 (1945); cf.
United States v. Butterworth-Judson Corp., 267 U.S. 387, 45 Sup. Ct. 338, 69 L. Ed. 672
(1925) (advances to contractor placed in special account upon which contractor paid
interest).
19. Of course, there is present the potential limitation of the power of Congress to
avoid the economic burden upon the Federal Government by the granting of an express
immunity from these taxes. City of Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329, 65 Sup. Ct.
280, 89 L. Ed. 274 (1945); Federal Land Bank of St. Paul -v.Bismarch Lumber Co.,
314 U.S. 95, 62 Sup. Ct. 1, 86 L. Ed. 65 (1941); Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan
Corporation, 308 U.S. 21, 60 Sup. Ct. 15, 84 L. Ed. 11, 124 A.L.R. 1263 (1939), 38
MicH. L. REv. 738 (1940), 14 TULANE L. REv. 143 (1939). But see Watkins, 'The Fading
of MeCullich v. Maryla4d, 17. TEXAs L. Rxv. 452 (1939).,
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TORTS-ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE-APPLICATION TO
BODIES OF WATER
Defendant maintained a water-filled excavation on his property, which
was located near a city sidewalk. Although children frequently waded in the
pool, defendant did nothing to warn them or to make the premises safe.
Plaintiff's eleven-year-old son stepped into one of many drop-offs in the pool
and was drowned. Held (3-2), defendant's demurrer to the complaint was
properly substained. Artifically created ponds and pools do not come within
the attractive nuisance doctrine. Plotzki v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 92

N.E.2d 632 (Ind. 1950).
As a general rule, a landowner owes no duty to make his premises safe for
trespassers.' The attractive nuisance, or "turntable, ' 2 doctrine is an exception
to this rule which is recognized in most American jurisdictions 3 The reasons
assigned for the application of the doctrine reflect the struggle that the courts
have had in imposing upon landowners the duty of due care toward trespassers.
4
It ha been suggested that the rationale is that the landowner has set a "trap,
or that the defendant's conduct amounted to an "implied invitation,"5 or that
the child is but a "technical trespasser," 6 or that the maxim sic utere tuo
alienum non laedas applies. 7 Some courts have refused to apply the doctrine
unless the condition actually attracted the child to the premises,8 but the better
1. PROSsun, TORTs 609 (1941); 38 Am. JuL, Negligence § 109 (1941); 65 C.J.S.
Negligence § 24a (1950).
2. So called because several early cases involved railroad turntables. E.g., Sioux City
& P.R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 21 L. Ed. 745 (1874) ; Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry.,

21 Minn. 207 (1875). See Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering Without

Permission,11 HARV. L. Ray. 349, 447 (1898) ; Hudson, Turntable Cases it; the Federal
Courts, 36 HI-v. L. Ray. 826 (1923).
3. PRossER, TORTS. 618 (1941). See Notes, 36 A.L.R. 34 (1925), 39 A.L.R. 486
(1925), 45 A.L.R. 982 (1926), 53 A.LR. 1344 (1928), 60 A.L.R. 1444 (1929), for elaborate
discussions of the doctrine and classification by states.
4. There seems to have been an attempt to draw an analogy to cases like Townsend v.
Wathen, 9 East 277, 103 Eng. Rep. 579 (K-B. 1808) where the defendant placed "a piece
of stinking meat" in a trap into which his neighbor's dogs were lured. This is the view
taken in 1 TnoMrsoN, NEGLGExCE 305 (lf ed. 1886y, cited in PRossm, ToRTs, 618
(1941).
5. "Now what an express invitation would be to an adult, the temptation of an
attractive plaything is to a child of tender years." Keffe v. Milwaukee and St. P. Ry.,
21 Minn. 207, 211 (1875). Contra: Cox v. Alabama Water Co., 216 Ala. 35, 112 So. 352,
53 A.LR. 1336 (1927) : "[I]t is hard to infer an inVitation from trespasses that have only
the merit of repetition." See Bottum v. Hawks, 84 Vt. 370, 79 Atl. 858, 35 L.R.A. (N.s.)
440, Ann. Cas. 1913A 1025 (1911).
6. E.g., Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Ill. 141, 39 N.E. 484, 27 L.R.A. 206, 45 Am. St. Rep.
114 (1895). The notion that the rule as to technical trespassers is a different one stems
from a misunderstanding of the difference between trespass and case, one of which requires
a specific intent. See Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns 391, 10 Am. Dec. 234 (N.Y. 1822).
7. E.g., Alabama G.S.R.R. v. Crocker, 131 Ala. 584, 31 So. 561 (1901). The maxim
is of little help in this type of case, because it was not intended to apply to trespassers.
Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering Without Perinission, 11 Htmw. L.
Rsv. 349, 440 (1898) ; Green, Landowner v. Intruder: Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of
Responsibility in Tort, 21 MICH. L. Rav. 495, 508 (1923). See Note, 36 A.L.R. 34, 111
(1925).

8. United Zinc and Chemical C6. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268, 42 Sup. Ct. 299, 66 L. Ed.

615, 36 A.L.R. 28 (1922). In thdt case two boys, ages 8 and 11, wandered onto defendant's
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view holds that liability need not depend on attraction, on the ground that society has a greater interest in protecting children from unreasonable risk of
harm than in preserving the landowner's privileges. 9 Some few courts have felt
that the abrogation of the general rule of nonliability was a matter for the
legislature, however socially desirable the doctrine might be.10
Although there is some division of authority, an overwhelming majority
of the courts hold that ponds and pools may not constitute an attractive nuisance."1 The basis of this view is that conditions common to nature, such
as fire1 2 and water, 13 do not present an unreasonable risk of harm, children
being presumed to have learned of these dangers.' 4 Further, since it is said
that the "same dangers" and "same attractions" are present in artificial
ponds, the courts reach the same result as for those conditions common
to nature.' 5 This view is generally extended to hold that drop-offs in an
artificial pool do not differ from those in a natural pool and thus are not
hidden or latent dangers.' 6
land and were poisoned in a pool they found after entering the land. Speaking through
Mr. Justice Holmes, the court said, ". . . there is no evidence that it was what led them
to enter the land.... There can be no general duty on the part of a landowner to keep
his land safe for children, or even free from hidden dangers, if he has not, directly or
by implication, invited or licensed them to come there." This case has been widely
criticized by the textwriters, and most authorities agree that the attraction requirement
ToRTs § 93 (1933). RESTATEMENT, Tomrs '1339,
is unnecessary. See, e.g., HA .i,
comment a (1934) does not recognize the requirement as essential to recovery. But in
Gouger v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 188 Tenn. 96, 216 S.W.2d 739 (1949), 2 VANm. L.
REv. 716, where plaintiff fell from a power line tower, recovery was denied because
plaintiff was attracted by the hum in the wires rather than by the tower.
9. "The better authorities now agree that the element of 'attraction' is important
only in so far as it may mean that the trespass is to be anticipated; and that the basis
of liability is merely the foreseeability of harm to the child, and considerations of common
humanity and social policy which curtail the defendant's privilege to use the land as he
sees fit." PRossER, ToaTs 619 (1941) ; see BoHLE,
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(1926) ; 1 THomPsoN, NEGLIGEICCE § 1027 (2d ed. 1-901) ; Green, Landowner v. Intruder;
Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of Responsibility in Tort, 21 Micr.L. Rnv. 495. (1923).
10. Bottum v. Hawks, 84 Vt 370, 79 At. 858, 35 L.R.A. (N.s.) 440, Ann. Cas.
1913A 1025 (1911).
11. E.g., Cox v.Alabama Water Co., 216 Ala.35, 112 So.352,'53 A.L.R. 1336 (1927);
McCall v.McCallie, 48 Ga.App. 99, 171 S.E. 843 (1933) ; Bottum v.Hawks, 84 Vt.370,
79 Atl. 858, 35 L.R.A. (N.s.) 440,Ann.Cas. 1913A 1025 (1911) ;Klix v. Nieman, 68 Wis.
141, 39
271, 32 N.W.223, 60 Am.Rep. 854 (1887). Contra: Pekin v.McMahon, 154 Ill.
N.E.484, 27 L.R.A. 206, 45 Am.St. Rep. 114 (1895) ; Indianapolis v. Williams, 58 Ind.
App. 447, 108 N.E. 387 (1915) (overruled by instant case, 92 N.E.2d 632 at 634). Set
Notes, 19 L.R.A. (x.s.) 1094 (1909); 47 L.R.A. (m.s.) 1101 (1914); 7 Ann. Cas. 200
(1907) ; 11 Ann.Cas. 990 (1909) ; 8 A.L.R.2d 1254 (1949). 56 Am. JuX., Waters § 436,
850 (1941).
12. Botticelli v.Winters, 125 Conn. 537, 7 A.2d 443 (1939); Pixossm, ToRas 622
(1941) ;38 Am. Jum., Negligence § 151 (1941).
13. Peters v.Bowman,115 Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 113, 598, 56 Am.St.Rep. 106 (1896);
Stendal v.Boyd, 73 Minn. 53, 75 N.W.735, 42 L.R.A. 288, 72 Am.St. Rep. 597 (1899);
Morris v.City of Britton, 66 S.D. 121, 279 N.W.531 (1938).
14. Instant case, 92 N.E.2d 632 at 634, citing Anderson v.Reith-Reilly Construction
Co., 112 Ind. App. 170, 44 N.E.2d 184, 185 (1942).
15. Peters v.Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 113 (1896), rehearing denied, 47 Pac.
598, 56 Am. St. Rep. 106 (1897).
16. The cases are collected inMaher v.Casper, 219 P.2d 125, 132 (Wyo.1950).
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The real basis of the attractive nuisance doctrine is the apparent probability of danger,' 7 and the landowner is said to owe to trespassing children
a duty to use reasonable care if (1) the trespass may reasonably be foreseen,
(2) the condition of the premises involves an unreasonable risk of harm to
the child, (3) the child does not discover or appreciate the danger because
of his immaturity, and (4) the utility of maintaining the condition is slight
as compared to the risk to the children.18 In determining the extent of the
landowner's duty, the court should also consider the accessibility of the
location, 19 the character, or condition of the premises, 20 the age of the child,'and the steps that could be taken by the landowner to make the condition
safe or to warn of the dangers involved. 22 In spite of the social desirability
of the doctrine, the courts have been reluctant to extend it to its full potential,
and too often have held that the landowner had no duty where a sound
application of the doctrine would impose such a duty.
In the instant case, the landowner knew that children frequently visited
his premises. He knew that there were drop-offs into which a child could

step and be drowned.

Many children might not realize that the perils

ordinarily incident to swimming pools or wading pools are not the same
as those involved in an unevenly excavated pit. In spite of this, the defendant
allowed the pool to -remain unfenced and unguarded, posted no notices
suggesting danger, did nothing to remove the attraction or to make the
premises safe. Thus, it would seem that the court was not justified in setting
forth as an unequivocal rule of law the statement that ponds and pools do not
come within the scope of the attractive nuisance doctrine.
17. Alabama G.S.R.R. v. Crocker, 131 Ala. 584, 31 So. 561, 563 (1901). "No one is

an insurer of the safety of a child merely because he is the owner of places or appliances
that may appeal to their youthful fancies." 20 R.C.L., Negligence § 78 (1918). See also
Frost v. Eastern Ry., 64- N.H. 220, 9 Atl. 790, 10 Am. St. Rep. 396 (1886) ; 38 Am. Jua.,
Negligewe § 147 (1941).
18. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 339 (1934). For other statements of requirements, see
HARPzR, TORTS § 93 (1933); PRossER, TORTS 621 (1941); 1 TuOMPsON, Negligence §§
1043-46 (2d ed. 1901) ; 38 Am. JuR., Negligence § 143 (1941) ; 65 C.J.S. § 29 (1) (1950).
19. If the condition is near a playground or a public street, there may arise a duty
to make the premises safe. PRossER, TORTS 621 (1941) ; see Murdock v. Penn. R.R., 150
Pa. Super. 156, 27 A.2d 405 (1942) (playground); Indianapolis v. Emmelman, 108 Ind.
530, 9 N.E. 155, 58 Am. Rep. 65 (1886) (excavation next to a public street).
. , 20. Some cases distinguish conditions on the basis of whether or not they are
artificial. Perhaps this results from a misapplication of the rule of liability without fault
placed upon "non-natural" users of land set forth in Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 1 Ex.
265 (1866), aff'd L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). Thus, in one jurisdiction which held that the
turntable doctrine applied to pools, the court held that the rule did not apply to ponds which
are reproductions of nature. Harper v. Topeka, 92 Kan. 11, 139 Pac. 1018 (1914).
21. 38 Am. Jum., Negligence § 158 (1941).

22. 38 Am. JuR. Negligence § 147 (1941). The expense or effort required on the

part of the landowner to correct the condition is important in determining whether or not
he has complied with his duty. For instance, in Sioux City & P.R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S.
657, 21 L. Ed. 745 (1874), it would have cost the defendant a trifling sum to repair the
broken latch on his turntable, while the expense to a farmer of fencing ponds would be
prohibitive and would not really serve to correct the condition, since a fence is a slight
deterrence in keeping an active boy from trespassing. Peters v. Bowman, 47 Pac. 598, 599,
56 Am. St. Rep. (Cal. 1897).-
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TORTS-DUTY OF LANDOWNER TO PERSONS OUTSIDE THE PREMISES
-LIABILITY OF BASEBALL PARK FOR INJURIES FROM BALLS
HIT OVER FENCE
While walking on a public street, plaintiff was struck by a baseball-hit
out of an abutting ball park owned and controlled by the defendant. Finding
that the defendant had knowledge that balls had previously been hit into the
street and had not thereafter taken any precautions to prevent 'a recurrence,
the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff. Held, affirmed. The
abutting landowner was guilty of negligence, in failing to take steps to protect
those outside his premises from the forseeable consequenfces of his activities.
Salevan v. Wilmington Park, 72 A.2d 239 (Del. Super. 1950).
The law requires an occupier of land to use his premises in such a manner
as not to create an unreasonable risk to others, whether by reason of the
character of the use itself or because of the manner in which it is conducted.'
There are peveral bases upon which a landowner might be held liable when
his use of the land causes injuries to others.2 Clearly he is liable for intentionally
inflicting injury upon another without legal justification. Jurisdictions following
the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher3 impose liability upon the landowner, not for
any fault in allowing the injury to occur, but rather for maintaining a dangerous
condition upon the land. Similarly, there is liability without fault 4 for injuries
resulting from extra-hazardous activities. 5 The nuisance doctrine applies -to
'that class of wrongs which arises from the unreasonable, unwarrantable, or
unlawful use by a person of his own property," 6 and includes "intentional
'7
harm and harms caused by negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous conduct.
It has been divided into two classifications: (1) nuisance per se,s which by their
very nature are inherently dangerous; and (2) nuisance in fact, which are not
inherently dangerous but which create an unlawful risk by reason of their
surroundings, locality, or the manner in which they are conducted. 9 It is not
to be understood that the occupier of land must forego all activities which pre-

1. PRossmE, TORTS § 73 (1941).
2. The courts have apparently encountered great difficulty in drawing clear distinctions between the tort actions applicable to this field. For excellent discussions of the
problem see Friedmann, Modern Trends in the Law of Torts, 1 MOD. L. REV. 39 (1937);
Note, Nuisance,Negligeice, and the Overlapting of Torts, 3 MoD. L. REv. 305 (1940).
3. L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866),-aff'd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
4.

RESTATEMENT,

TORTS § 520 (1938).

5. Patrick v. Smith, 75 Wash. 407, 134 Pac. 1076, 48 L.R.A. (N.s.) 740 (1913)
(blasting); Cumberland Torpedo Co. v. Gaines, 201 Ky. 88, 255 S.W. 1046 (1923)
(storing explosives); Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952,
60 A.L.R. 475 (1928) (drilling oilwells). See Note, 23 CALIF. L. Rzv. 427 (1935).
6. 39 Am. JuR., Nuisance § 2 (1942).
7. Taylor v. Cincinnati, 143 Ohio St. 426, 55 N.E.2d 724, 155 A.L.R. 44 (1944). See
Prosser, Nuisance Withoit Fault, 20 TEx. L. REV. 399 (1942).
8. Defined in Wilson v. Evans Hotel Co., 188 Ga. 498, 4 S.E.2d 155, 158, 124 A.L.R.
373 (1939).
9. "If the natural tendency of the act complained of is to create danger and inflict
injury upon person or property, it may properly be found a nuisance as a matter of fact."
Melker v. City of New York, 190 N.Y. 481, 83 N.E. 565, 567 (1908)."
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sent a risk to others, but rather that he is under a duty to exercise due care
in the use of his land to protect those beyond his premises to whom barn

is reasonably foreseeable. 10 His failure to do so constitutes actionable negligence.1
As in the instant case, where a ball hit out of a sporting field strikes

a person outside the premises, the injured party has the practical problem of
selecting the best theory upon which to predicate a suit for damages. 12 Although urged by the plaintiff in several cases of this type, the rule in Rylands V.
Fletcher has uniformly been held to have no application.' 3 Nor is baseball
treated as an extra-hazardous activity, or of such an inherently dangerous nature as to constitute a nuisance per se.14 However, there is language in several
cases which would indicate that if the act has frequently occurred, and has

created a substantial danger to persons in the vicinity, the game in that
particular locality and under those conditions may become a nuisance in
fact. 5 Even though the plaintiff may fail to establish that under the particular circumstances the defendant's use of the land for ball games constitutes
a nuisance, he may still recover in a negligence action'0 by proving that the
defendant did not exercise due care'1 to protect-those outside his premises
from the reasonably foreseeable risks of the game. This has frequently been

evidenced by showing that the defendant had actual or constructive' 8 notice that
balls were being hit out of the premises, 9 and that he did not thereafter 20 take
22
reasonable precautions 2' to prevent a further occurrence.
10. PRossER, ToRTs § 73

11. Id., § 76.

(1941).

12. See Note, 66 ScoT. L. Rv.81 (1950).
13. Harrington v. Border City Mfg. Co., 240 Mass. 170, 132 N.E. 721, 18 A.L.R.
610 (1921); Dwyer v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 273 Mass. 234, 173 N.E. 594
(1930) ; Stone v. Bolton, [1950] 1 K.B. 201, [1949] 2 All E.R. 851.
14. E.g., Young v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 136 App. Div. 730, 121 N.Y. Supp.
517 (2d Dep't 1910).
15. Young v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., supra note 19; see also Gleason v. Hillcrest
Golf Course, 148 Misc. 246, 265 N.Y. Supp. 886 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1933): Castle v. St.
Augustine's Links, 38 T.L.R. 615 (1922); Stone v. Bolton, [1950] 1 K.B. 201, [1949]
2 All E.R. 851.
16. "The defendant could not, by acts permitted or authorized on its land, negligently
injure the plaintiff while she was lawfully on the highway. . . " Harrington v. Border
City Mfg. Co., 240 Mass. 170, 132 N.E. 721, 18 A.L.R. 610 (1921).
17. It would seem material if the landowner laid out his premises according to a
reasonable original design. But see Louisville Baseball Club v. Hill, 291 Ky. 333, 164
S.W.2d 398 (1942). For discussion see Malone, Contributory Negligence and the Landowner Cases, 29 Mixi. L. REv. 61, 74 (1945).
18. "It is common knowledge that professional baseball players are trained and
coached to knock the ball over the fence for a home run and that such a feat is not at
all unusual. Hence we are constrained to hold that [the defendant] had notice that balls
were often knocked over this fence onto the public street ...
and that it was bound to
anticipate such balls might strike and injure persons thereon." Louisville Baseball Club v.
Hill, 291 Ky. 333,' 164 S.W.2d 398, 400 (1942).
19. Morris, Proof of Safety History in, Negligence Cases, 61 HARV. L. REv. 205
(1948).
20. See instant case, 72 A.2d at 243.
21. It may'be that it will be sufficient if the defendant considered the danger and
came to the conclusion that the risk involved was remote. "Failure to guard against
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The court in the instant case apparently collected all of the reported

American "over the fence" cases,2 3 as well as an analogous case involving
golf. 24 From them the court derives a rule which harmonizes the cases and
provides a ready measurement of the landowner's liability.25 The court points
out that the rule is basically a. rule of reason, stating that "[w] hat precautions
are reasonable must depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular,
28
case."

TRUSTS-TRACING OF FUNDS MINGLED WITH DECEDENT TRUSTEE'S
ESTATE-STATUTE LIMITING TIME FOR FILING CLAIMS AGAINST
ESTATE HELD INAPPLICABLE, WITHOUT REQUIRING TRACING
OF ASSETS
Plaintiff sued the executors of the will of one Crow to recover funds
which were alleged to have been held in trust for the plaintiff by Crow. The
complaint alleged the existence of a trust and that "Crow invested the money
without plaintiff's knowledge and at his death 'said trust fund' together with
its earnings came into possession of the executors." No accounting was ever
made by the decedent trustee. The trial court held that the existence of a
trust was proved, that this was sufficient for recovery, and that the "nonclaim" statute:' limiting the period for claimants' filing of claims with the
executors was not applicable. Held (5-2), affirmed. Plaintiff can recover

a remote possibility of accident ....

does not constitute negligence." Lane v. City of
Buffalo, 232 App. Div. 334, 250 N.Y. Supp. 579, 584 (4th Dep't 1931). See also Note,
66 Scar. L. Riv. 81, 84 (1950).
22. Honaman v. City of Philadelphia, 322 Pa. 535, 185 At. 750 '(1936); Stone v.
Bolton, (1950) 1 K.B. 201, (1949) 2 All E.R. 851.23. Louisville Baseball Club v. Hill, 291 Ky. 333, 164 S.W.2d 398 (1942); Harrington v. Border City Mfg. Co., 240 Mass. 170, 132 N.E. 721, 18 A.L.R. 610 (1921) ; Dwyer
v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 273 Mass. 234, 173 N.E. 594 (1930); Young v.
New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 136 App. Div. 730, 121 N.Y. Supp. 517 (2d Dep't 1910);
Jones v. Kane and Roach, Inc., 182 Misc. 37, 43 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Sup. Ct. 1943) ; Honaman
v. City of Philadelphia, 322 Pa. 535, 185 Atl. 750 (1936) ; Wills v. Wisconsin-Minnesota
Light and Power Co., 187 Wis. 626, 205 N.W. 556 (1925).
24. Gleason v. Hillcrest Golf Course, 148 Misc. 246, 265 N.Y. Supp. 886 (-N.Y. Munic.
Ct. 1933) ; Note 13 B.U.L. Rnv. 772. See also English cases: Castle v. St. Augustine's
Links, 38 T.L.R. 615 (1922) (golf); and Stone v. Bolton, [1950] 1 K.B. 201, [1949]
2 All E.R. 851 discussed in 66 Scor. L. Ray. 81 (1950) (cricket).
25. "This rule is that the playing of baseball with the permission of the landowner on
land adjacent to a highway does not of itself create a public nuisance which would make
the landowner an insurer of the safety of persons lawfully using the highway. The inherent
nature of the game of baseball, however, is such as to require the -landowner to take
reasonable precautions for the protection of the traveling public. What precautions are
reasonable must depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Only
those precautions are required which the inherent nature of the game and its past history
in the particular location make necessary for the protection of a person lawfully using
the highways. The burden is on the plaintiff to show the necessity for precautions to
have been taken by the landowner for the ,protection of the public. The failure of the
plaintiff to bear that burden will result in non-suit or a directed verdict for the defendant."
72 A.2d at 243.
26. Id. at 243.
1, OHro GEN. CoDE ANN. § 10509-112 (1938). For discussion of the application
of such statutes, see 21 Am. Jua., Executors and Administrators §§348 et seq. (1939).
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her own money as a trust fund without compliance with the statute since she
is not asserting a "claim" against the estate.2 Staley v. Krienbihl, 89 N.E.2d
593 (Ohio 1949).
In the instant case the court recognizes the proposition that unless the
plaintiff can identify the trust fund itself, or the proceeds of the fund, she
will be classed as only a general creditor against the estate of a bankrupt or deceased trustee. 4 The requirements for tracing a trust fund are strict, though
the former requirement of identifying specific coin or money" has been generally repudiated. 6 If the claimant succeeds in tracing trust property still
in the hands of the trustee or of a person not a bona fide purchaser, 7 he is
entitled to it because he is equitably the owner.8
The claimant generally must bear the burden of proof in tracing the fund
or its proceeds. 9 A majority of the courts deny the remedy of tracing where
the proof of the beneficiary merely shows that the fund was received by the
trustee and shows nothing as to subsequent dealings with the fund or its proceeds, 10 and hold that the claimant is not aided by any presumption that the
trust assets remained in the hands of the trustee for any particular period or
2. The court also affirmed the holding of the trial court that since the interest on
the fund was not sufficiently proved, it constituted a debt or chose against the estate
which was barred by the limitation of the statute.
3. It is well settled that the mere change of money into property, or vice versa, does
not deprive one of his interest in it. 4 BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES § 921 (1948).
4. St. Louis & San Francisco R.R. v. Spiller, 274 U.S. 304, 47 Sup. Ct. 635, 71
L. Ed. 1060 (1927) ; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 96 F.2d 487 (6th Cir. 1938); Yesner
v. Comm'r, 252 Mass. 358, 148 N.E. 224 (1925); Ames, Following Misappropriated
Property into Its Product, 19 HARV. L. REv. 511 (1906) ; Bogert, Failed Banks, Collection
Items, and Trust Preferences,29 MICH. L. REv.545 (1931) ; Scott, The Right to Follow
Money Wrongfully Mingled with Other Money, 27 HARV. L. R~v. 125 (1913); Note,
82 A.L.R. 46 (1933).
5. Sabine Canal Co. v. Crowley Trust & Savings Bank, 164 La. 33, 113 So. 754
(1927) ; In re North Riber Bank, 60 Hun. 91, 14 N.Y. Supp. 261 (1st Dep't 1891) ; Black
v. State Savings Bank, 12 Wash. 619, 41 Pac. 909 (1895).
6. Allen v. United States, 285 Fed. 678 (1st Cir. 1923); Poisson v. Williams, 15
F.2d 582 (E.D.N.C. 1926) ; Woodhouse v. Crandall. 197 Ill. 104, 64 N.E. 292, 58 L.R:A.
385 (1902); Hudspeth v. Union Trust & Savings Bank, 196 Iowa 706, 195 N.W. 378,
31 A.L.R. 466 (1923); 4 BOGERT, TRuSTS A~n TRUSTEES § 923 (1948); Scott, The
Right to Follow Money Wrongfully Mingled -with Other Money, 27 HAuV. L. Ruw.
125 (1913).
7. 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUsTEEs § 881 (1948).
8. "'The true owner of a trust fund traced to the possession of another has the
right to have it restored, not as a debt due and owing, but because it is his property
wrongfully withheld from him.'" Cook v. Crider, 63 Ohio App. 12, 24 N.E.2d 966, 968
(1939), citing 26 R.C.L., Trusts § 216 (1920).
9. State Bank of Winfield v. Alva Security Bank, 232 Fed. 847 (8th Cir. 1916);
In, re See, 209 Fed. 172 (2d Cir. 1913) ; Philadelphia Nat. Bank v. Dowd, 38 Fed. 172,
2 L.R.A. 480 (E.D.N.C. 1889); Matter of Cavin v. Gleason, 105 N.Y. 256, 11 N.E. 504
(1887); Williston, The Right to Follow Trust Property When Confused with Other
Property, 2 HARv. L. REv. 28 (1888). These rules apply to constructive trusts as well
as express trusts. Brooks v. Cherry, 298 S.W. 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
10. St. Louis & San Francisco R.R. v. Spiller, 274 U.S. 304, 47 Sup. Ct. 635 71 L. Ed.
1060 (1927); Holbrook Irr. District v. First State Bank, 84 Colo. 157, 268 Pac. 523
(1928) ; Hutchins v. Hutchins, 141 Me. 183, 41 A.2d 612 (1945) ; Wilson v. Coburn, 35
Neb. 530, 53 N.W. 466 (1892).
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until the time of the assertion of the claim.11 There is some authority, however,
that the trustee is charged with the duty himself to show what has happened
to the trust res since he is in a better position to know of his own dealings, 12
especially if his estate is large enough to satisfy the trust claim and also pay
his creditors.' 3 The instant case deals with an estate of over $800,000, and
there appear to be sufficient assets to pay the general creditors in addition
to the trust claim.
The plaintiff in the instant case proved that the fund had come into the
hands of the trustee and had never been accounted for. The court accepts
this alone as a proof that "the trust property was sufficiently identified."' 4
The court requires no proof as to how "Mr. Crow invested the money without
plaintiff's knowledge,"' 5 nor whether the investment proved gainful, nor that
the trustee was solvent to the amount of the fund at all times thereafter.' 6
The court adopts the statement from Ohio Jurisprudence that "'He does
all the law requires if he shows that the goods or bills or coin came into the
hands of the defendant impressed with a trust to his knowledge.' "'17 This
doctrine appears unique to the "tracing" theory of recovery of the majority,
though it will apply to the minority theory of recovery--i.e., that the
entire estate of the trustee is impressed with a trust to the extent of the claim.' 8
The court notes the latter theory without specifically accepting or denying
it: "'There is, however, some authority for giving the cestui que trust a
charge on the entire estate of the trustee where the trust money is so mixed
with his general property that it cannot be traced into any particular property
or fund.' "'9 The court apparently assumes from the size of the decedent's
estate that it was at all times large enough to cover the trust claim involved in
this case.20
11. Florence Mines Co. v. Prescott State Bank, 36 Ariz. 472, 287 Pac. 296 (1930);

Mathewson v. Wakelee, 83 Conn. 75, 75 Atl. 93 (1910); Andrew v. Citizens' State Bank,
205 Iowa 237, 216 N.W. 12 (1927) ; Farinha v. Commissioner of Banks, 303 Mass. 192, 21
N.E.2d 239 (1939) ; McDowell v. McDowell, 144 Tenn. 452, 234 S.W. 319 (1921).
12. American Surety Co. v. Jackson, 23 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1928), 24 ILL. L. RE%.
250 (1929) ; Smith v. Mittley, 150 Fed. 266 (6th Cir. 1906) ; Simmons v. Barns, 263 Mass.

472, 161 N.E. 821 (1928).

If it is proved that the trust funds went into the hands of

the trustee and remained there, but because of the wrongful mingling with other funds

by the trustee, they cannot be identified, the doctrine of "confusion of goods" may be
applied and the trustee or his successor required to separate the trust assets from the
mass, under penalty of losing the entire mass if no separation can be effected. 4 BOGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 925 (1948).
13. Eaton v. Husted, 141 Tex. 349, 172 S.W.2d 493 (1943).
14. 89 N.E.2d at 599.
15. Id. at 595.
16. But see note 11 supra; 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 925 (1948).
17. 89 N.E.2d at 599, citing 40 OHIO JURISPRUDENcE 326.
18. 65 C.J., Trusts § 899 (1933).
19. 89 N.E.2d at 597, citing 65 C.J., Trusts § 900 (1933).
20. Citing Massey v. Fisher, 62 Fed. 958 (E.D. Pa. 1894), which required that a
sum equal to the fund continuously remain in the hands of the trustee, the court disposes
of the matter:

". .

. who is hurt by Eva Staley recovering this money which the court

below unanimously found belonged to Eva Staley?"
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It appears that the instant holding has adopted either (1) a very lenient
view of the otherwise strict "tracing" theory, out of line with the general
case law,21 or (2) the theory that the entire estate is impressed with a trust.
The presumption of continuance of the fund in the hands of the trustee appears
harmless under these facts, although, as stated above, the majority of the
courts allow no such presumption.
Treating the whole estate as impressed with a trust is not the same solution as placing a "charge" or equitable lien on the entire estate. The former
treats the whole estate as the claimant's own property to the extent of his
trust interest, while the latter is a preferred lien to the extent of the claimant's
interest. Would not such a preferred lien be subject to the limitations of the
nonclaim statute ?22
The instant case appears to be one in which a presumption of continuance
of the trust fund in the hands of the trustee may be equitably applied.
But this presumption if followed as precedent for future litigation, should be
limited to those cases where the estate of the trustee is solvent and no harm
will result to general creditors.

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSAT[ON-AVAILABILITY FOR WORKLABOR MARKET AS TO HOME WORKERS
Claimant was licensed by the State Department of Labor as a hand sewing
home worker, and had been employed in that capacity. Employer discountinued
all home work as a matter of policy and offered claimant similar employment
at its factory. Because of physical infirmities, she declined this employment.
Claimant made efforts to find home work in an area where there were only
three such employed home workers and no prospects for openings. Upon her
application for unemployment benefits, the Board of Review found that
claimant had declined suitable employment without good cause, and it therefore disallowed the claim. Held, affirmed. Claimant's availability for work is
so restricted as to render her unemployable in view of the absence of a labor
market for home work in the area. Unemployment compensation provides
relief only for involuntary unemployment, and unemployment is not involuntary where the individual is unable to work or is unavailable for work.
Valenti v. Board of Review of Unemployment Compensation Commission,
72 A.2d 516 (N.J. 1950).1
21. 89 N.E.2d at 598.

22. Massey v. Fisher, 62 Fed. 958 (E.D. Pa. 1894).
23. See 4 BoGEmT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEs Ch. 44 (1948).
24. See the dissenting opinion of Taft, J., in the principal case. 89 N.E.2d at 600.
1. For the contrary decision of the intermediate court, see Valenti v. Board of Review,
4 N.J. Super. 162, 66 A.2d 565 (1949).
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Unemployment insurance was inaugurated by the Social Security Act
of 1935,2 and today unemployment compensation laws are in force in all of
the states.3 The laws are designed to relieve the distress of economic insecurity, without the stigma of charity, 4 but in every state the benefits are
extended only to those genuinely unemployed persons who are attached to
the labor market, who are able to work, and who are available for workY
Generally, one is "able to work" if he is willing to work and has the physical
and mental ability to perform some services. 6 And usually one is said to be
"available for work" when he is genuinely attached to the labor market, 7 i.e.,"
when he is ready, willing, and able to accept suitable work which he does
not have good cause to refuse. 8 Further, the disqualification sections of the
2. 49 STAT. 620 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 501-03, 1101-10 (1943), 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 503 (a) (5), 1104 (Supp. 1949). The Act provides a Federal-state arrangement principally designed to induce the states to carry out a system for unemployment
insurance. Armstrong, The Federal Social Security Act and Its Constitutional Aspects,
24 CALIF. L. REv. 247, 255 (1936); Witte, An Historical Account of Unemployment
Insurance h the Social Security Act, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 157 (1936). See Eberling,
The Employntent Security Program, 1 VAND. L. REV. 376 (1948) (special reference to
Tennessee unemployment insurance); Gray, Unemployment Insurance in the State of
New York, 13 N.Y.U.L.Q. RE-. 19 (1935); Notes, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 288 (1936)
(California unemployment compensation laws), 85 U. or PA. L. REV. 511 (1937)
(Pennsylvania unemployment compensation).
3. E.g., ILL ANN. ST. c. 48 §§ 217-60 (1950); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 43:21-1-:
43:21-56 (1950); Onto GEN. CODE ANN. §§' 1345-1-1346-5 (1946), as amended, OHIO
GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 1345-1-1346-4 (Supp. 1949) ; TENN. CoDE ANN. §§ 6901.25-6901.44
(Williams Supp. 1949). Similar laws are in effect in the District of Columbia, Alaska and
Hawaii.
4. ALTMAN, AVAILABILITY FOR WORK 17 (1950). See Copper Range Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 320 Mich. 460, 31 N.W.2d 692, 696 (1948) ; Godsol v.
Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 302 Mich. 652, 5 N.W.2d 519, 524 (1942).
5. For a general discussion of unemployment compensation, see ALTMAN,
(1950) ; Burns, Unemployment Compensation and
AvAILAB rITY F0R WouR
Socio-Economic Objectives, 55 YALE LJ. 1 (1945) ; Wandel, Introduction, 10 OHIo ST.
L.J. 121 (1949); Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 21
(1945). For examples of state legislation, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-4 (1950) ; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 6901.28 C (Williams Supp. 1949). See Freeman, Availability: Active Search
for Work, 10 OHIo ST. L.J. 181 (1949); Harrison, Eligibility and Disqualification for
Benefits, 55 YALE L.J. 117 (1945).
6. Haynes v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 353 Mo. 540, 183 S.W.2d 77
(1944) ; Hinkle v. Lennox Furnace Co., 150 Ohio St. 471, 83 N.E.2d 521 (1948) ; ALTMAN,
AVAILABILITY FOR WORK 140 (1950) ; Freeman, Able to Work and Available for Work,
55 YALE L.J. 123, 128 (1945).
7. Reger v. Adm'r, 132 Conn. 647, 46 A.2d 844 (1946) ; Dwyer v. Appeal Board,
321 Mich. 178, 32 N.W.2d 434 (1948); Altman and Lewis, Limited Availability for
Shift Employment: A Criterionof Eligibility for Unemployment Compensation, 28 MINN.
L.
387, 22 N.C.L. REv. 189 (1944).
. REV.
8. Reger v. Adm'r, 132 Conn. 647, 46 A.2d 844 (1946) ; Leonard v. Board of Review,
148 Ohio St. 419, 75 N.E.2d 567 (1947); ALTMAN, AVAILABILITY FOR Wo , 13 (1950)
(certain basic factors which condition the availability interpretation in unemployment
compensation: the general employment level, public opinion, national employment policy,
the general political concept, and the purposes of unemployment compensation). But see
Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Board of Review, 70 Ohio App. 370, 45 N.E.2d 152 (1942).
That the burden of proof as to availability rests on the claimant, see Clinton v. Hake, 185
Tenn. 476, 206 S.W.2d 889 (1947) ; Reese v. Hake, 184 Tenn. 423, 199 S.W.2d 569 (1947).
That the determination of availability depends on the facts of each case, see Leonard v.
Board of Review, 148 Ohio St. 419, 75 N.E.2d 567 (1947) ; Ezell v. Hake, 184 Tenn. 319,
198 S.W.2d 809 (1947). That the compensation laws are usually liberally interpreted, see
United States v. Silk, 331 U.S 704 721 67 Sup. Ct. 1463, 91 L. Ed. 1757 (1947);
Schwlng v. United States, 165 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1948) ; 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES ANn
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state laws instruct the commissioners in determining availability to consider
such factors as the degree of risk to claimant's health, safety and morals; his
physical fitness and prior training; his experience and prior earnings; his
length of unemployment and prospects for securing local work in his customary
occupation; and the distance of the available work from his residence.0 Benefits
will not be denied to an otherwise eligible applicant who refuses employment if
work conditions are less favorable than those prevailing for similar work in
the locality.10 Also, a claimant is not rendered "unavailable for work" merely
because there is no work available for him,"' nor merely because he is limited
as to the field of suitable work which he could accept, unless as a result of
12
his limitation it could not be said that he was attached to the labor market.
A further problem in the determination of availability for work is the consideration of the labor market, which has been defined as a market for the
type of services which an individual offers in the geographical area in which
he offers them.13 There need not be actual job vacancies, but the type of
services which an individual offers must be generally performed in the
geographical area in which he offers them. The decisions disclose little
uniformity with respect to what amount of a particular type of work in an
14
area may constitute "general performance" of that work.
Satisfying the availability requirement, a claimant is eligible to receive
benefits until he refuses an offer of "suitable" work. 1 The determination of
suitability of work appears to involve a compromise between the interests of
the worker and those of society, 10 but consideration of the applicant's personal
circumstances are often ignored.'1
It would appear to be the better view that home workers should be held to
be employees within the terms of the compensation laws' 8 and thus, if otherSTATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 7211 (3d ed. 1943) ; Note, 17 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 447 (1949).
But see Alexander Hamilton Hotel Corp. V. Board of Review, 127 N.J.L. 184, 21 A.2d

739, 741 (1941).

9. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(c) (1950); TENN. CODE ANN. § 6901.29 D.
(Williams, Supp. 1949).
10. Social Security Act of 1935, 49 SrAT. 640 (1935), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1103 (a) (5)
(B) (1943).
11. Reger v. Adm'r, 132 Conn. 647, 46 A.2d 844, 846 (1946).
12. Freeman, Able to Work and Available for Work, 55 YALE L.J. 126 (1945).
13. Reger v. Adm'r, 132 Conn. 647, 46 A.2d 844, 846 (1946). That the bounds of
such labor market area will vary as to the occupation and industry, see Dwyer v. Appeal
Board, 321 Mich. 178, 32 N.W.2d 434 (1948).
14. ALTMAN, AVAiLABILITY FOR WORK 110 (1950).
15. Menard, Refusal of Suitable Work, 55 YALE L.J. 134 (1945) (factors bearing
on suitability); Teple, Disqualification: Discharge for Misconduct and Voluntary Quit,
10 OHIO ST. L.J. 191, 202 (1949). There appears to be a marked divergence of opinion
in the decision as to what work is "suitable." Note, 10 Oi1 ST. L.J. 232 (1949).
16. Bums, Unemployment Compensation and Socio-Econoinic Objectives, 55 YAL,
L.J. 1 (1945).
17. Craig v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 83 Ohio App. 247, 83 N.W.2d
628 (1
. Contra: Bowman v. Troy Launderers and Cleaners, Inc., 215 Minn. 226, 9
N.W.2d 506 C(1943).
18. For cases involving taxation of the employer under the compensation laws where
home workers have been held to be employees, see Schwing v. United States, 165 F.2d
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wise qualified, eligible to receive benefits-particularly where, as in the instant
case, home workers are required by state law to have work licenses. 19 Thus, it
would seem to follow that in some instances offered work outside of the home
might not be "suitable." But the holding in the instant case proceeds on another
ground-the lack of a labor market for home work in the area. However, with
respect to all these factors the interviewing Board of Review is vested with
broad discretionary powers, and the fact that the Board deals directly with
the individual in the determination of a particular case would, in the final
analysis, weigh heavily.20
518 (3d Cir. 1948); Andrews v. Commodore Knitting Mills, Inc., 257 App. Div. 515,
13 N.Y.S.2d 577 (3d Dep't 1939); Allied Mutuals Liability Ins. Co. v. De Jong, 209
App. Div. 505, 205 N.Y. Supp. 165 (1st Dep't 1924) ; Note, 143 A.L.R. 418 (1943).
Contra: Glenn v. Beard, 141 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1944); Kentucky Cottage Industries,
Inc. v. Glenn, 39 F. Supp. 642 (W.D. Ky. 1941).
19. Peasley v. Murphy, 381 II. 187, 44 N.E.2d 876 (1942).
20. TENx. CoDE ANN. § 6901.30 I (Williams Supp. 1949). See Welch v. Review
Board, 115 Ind. App. 230, 58 N.E.2d 363, 366 (1944) ; Clinton v. Hake, 185 Tenn. 476, 481,
206 S.W.2d 889, 891 (1947) ; Ezell v. Hake, 184 Tenn. 319, 324, 198, S.W.2d 809, 811
(1947).

